interview the king does not look overly impressive. He begins by stating Daniel's pedigree as a child of captivity, then informs him that while the conjurers of the realm cannot solve this problem, Daniel is the one who can loosen his knots (מָצֵּא לְהַשְׁאֵרָ֥ה). So, Daniel is second choice over the wise men, yet it is the captive from Judah who is the only one who can read the Aramaic language. To be sure, it is Belshazzar who is looking rather ridiculous at this moment, with defiled royal garments and all. It is no wonder that Daniel tersely begins his reply by explaining that the king can keep his presents to himself. This carnivalesque moment is not only worthy of Rabelais but must contribute to the larger satirical vision of the Dan 1–6, and if chapter 5 represents Belshazzar’s last night, then he exits the stage of this world in a rather embarrassing manner. One of the classic reasons for wordplay is to underscore a reversal of fortune, and the king’s knotty problem is humbling in a most scatological manner. As David Vaila affirm, the resources of the Aramaic language are used for subversion and satire, and the day of judgment arrives in Belshazzar’s court just as it visits other earthly empires that set themselves up against the Most High God.


Vernon K. Robbins

When Kenneth Burke wanted to define the principles underlying the appeal of literature in 1931, he discussed thirty-nine topics in a chapter entitled “Lexicon Rhetoricae” (1968:123–83). When Michael Holquist published M. M. Bakhtin’s The Dialogic Imagination in 1981, he included a glossary with forty major topics, under which were many subtopics, to explain the way Bakhtin invests everyday words with special content to explain his theory of language and literature (1981:423–34). These topics and subtopics function as a lexicon dialogicae that reconfigures multiple aspects of the lexicon rhetoricae that emerged from the work of Burke and others during the twentieth century (Bizzell and Herzberg 1990:897–1266).

The contributors to this volume either discuss or refer in the introduction to nine topics or subtopics that appear in the 1981 glossary of Bakhtin’s words (genre [428], monologic [monoglossia: 430], dialogic [dialogism: 426–27], voice [434], chronotope [425–26], polyphony [polyglossia: 431], unfinalizability [completed: 426], heteroglossia [428], and dialogization [427]). They also discuss a term not included in the glossary, carnivalesque, which Bakhtin did not feature in the four essays in The Dialogic Imagination but which played a major role in Rabelais and His World and Problems of Dostoevsky’s Poetics. By my count, the essays I have been asked to review (Buss, Newsom, Vines, Fuller, Anderson, and Maddison) in some manner or another refer to approximately twenty-five of the forty topics or subtopics in the glossary. The point is that they discuss more than half of Bakhtin’s overall lexicon as it is displayed in The Dialogic Imagination.

One should readily grant that it would be cumbersome to create a Semelia Studies volume for people interested in biblical interpretation that contained all of the special terms Holquist included in the 1981 glossary to exhibit the nature of Bakhtin’s dialogical, heteroglossic hermeneutical system. But if we
cannot expect all of them to appear, how many should we expect in six essays on biblical canon, apocalyptic, New Testament, and Toni Morrison so they present a substantive Bakhtinian approach? We get, perhaps as one might expect, significantly different uses and highly varied applications of aspects of Bakhtin's approach to language and literature in these six essays. For the most part, the authors energize in one way or another an approach to biblical literature in which they, or some others in the field of biblical scholarship, have been engaged for a number of decades, or even for a century. The exception is the author of the essay on Toni Morrison's Beloved. Using the skills and resources available to a modern literary critic, the author of this essay makes this biblical scholar yearn for a time when biblical scholarship will be able to embed its remarkable knowledge in even more dynamic modes of analysis and interpretation than have been evolving during the last four decades. But now let us turn to the authors of these six essays by name.

Martin Buss, entitling his essay "Dialogue in and among Genres," uses Bakhtin's concepts of genre, voice, and dialogue as he discusses issues concerning the Hebrew Bible canon he has discussed in three earlier contexts: an essay on form criticism (1974); an essay on Hosea as a canonical problem (1996); and a chapter on "Implicit Recognition of Forms of Speech" in a chapter on "Biblical Patterns" in his book Biblical Form Criticism (1999:27-30). When Buss introduces the term "genre" to the reader, he qualifies the term with "or speech type." His four assertions about genres in the Hebrew Bible either explicitly or implicitly lead to additional terms in the Bakhtinian lexicon dialogicae. Without referring to Bakhtin's distinction between "single-voiced discourse" (the dream of poets) and "double-voiced discourse" (the realm of the novel: 1981:324–31, 354, 434) or the "addressivity of the utterance" (1986:95–100), Buss asserts first that a genre can be identified on the basis of "the kind of address it embodies."

There are four kinds of address in particular, Buss suggests, that are helpful for analyzing genre in the Bible: (1) by God to humans; (2) by humans to God; (3) by humans to others about God; and (4) by humans to others without reference to God. This leads to a second assertion that the Hebrew Bible is largely arranged according to genres, namely, kinds of speech (see Buss 1999:27). Buss mentions five kinds: law, prophecy, narrative, proverb, and reflective discussion, which he introduces with a special eye on Job and Qoheleth. These five kinds, he suggests, tend to be gathered together either to create an entire writing or to form a particular section of a writing. In 1999 he also observed that "the vast majority of psalms" are gathered "in just one book" (27). It would have been highly appropriate for Buss to observe that Bakhtin perceived this kind of "gathering together" to be a centralizing force in any language or culture, which he considered to be a "centripetal influence," a participation in the "unitary language," that was caused by the rulers and high poetic genres of any era (1981:272–73, 425). A discussion of the centripetal forces and tendencies in every utterance leads naturally, in Bakhtin's thought, to a discussion of the centrifugal, stratifying forces in every utterance, namely, social and historical heteroglossia.

This leads naturally to Buss's third assertion, that there is variety within each genre. From Bakhtin's perspective, the variety functions as a decentralizing and dispersing force that creates "alternative 'degraded' genres down below" (1981:425). Explicit use of Bakhtin's concepts of centripetal and centrifugal forces within concrete utterances in a discussion of canon in the essay could have led, I suggest, to very interesting observations about the kinds of "extracanonical" literature that emerged during the third, second, and first centuries B.C.E. and the kinds of "degraded" genres (Gospels, letters, and apocryphal) that became central to the New Testament canon. It also would be interesting to know if Buss considers any of the genres in the Hebrew Bible to feature soliloquy, monologic discourse in Bakhtin's terminology. Jack Miles asserts that God talks to himself during the creation and again just after the flood, but from the call of Abraham onward, "every word he says is specifically addressed" (2001:41). Then, concerning the New Testament Miles asserts: "The Gospel of John reads at times like a book-length soliloquy with occasional digressions into conversation" (41). Does Buss see any genre in the Hebrew Bible that does not feature "dialogue"? It appears that the answer is no.

Buss's observation about variety in each genre leads him to a fourth assertion about the potential fruitfulness of dialogue between the Hebrew Bible and other bodies of tradition. Here one wonders if Buss remains in Bakhtin's conceptual domain of thinking about language and literature. Buss asserts that dialogue between traditions is likely to be most productive when similar genres are put in dialogue with one another through comparison. But is this what Bakhtin would say? Would Bakhtin focus instead on comparing any two utterances that are somehow similar, whether or not the interpreter perceives them to be "of a similar genre"? The point would be that any two utterances that an interpreter is somehow able to put in dialogue with one another may produce what Bakhtin called "interanimation" or "interillumination" (1981:429–30). Indeed, might Bakhtin have considered it to be more productive to compare discourses in different traditions on the basis of their chronotopes? It is obvious that Buss finds Bakhtin to be a fellow traveler in many respects as he investigates the Hebrew Bible canon with deep philosophical understandings of the nature of language, literature, and form. Perhaps deeper probing into Bakhtin's dialogical lexicon in the essay could have made the interesting observations about form and the Hebrew Bible
canonical even more accessible and usable to other interpreters, whether they be interpreters of the New Testament or the Qur'an, Hindu, or Buddhist literature, or any other kind of literature, sacred or otherwise.

As Buss's essay unfolds, it seems to be building on Bakhtin's concept of "everyday genre," as it is translated in the 1981 glossary: "what ordinary people live, and their means for communicating with each other." (428). This would seem to be the effect of Buss's emphasis on "life process," rather than on Gunkel's focus on "life situation," for the identification of genre. The emphasis on everyday life emerges in Buss's discussion of wisdom literature when he postulates that this genre was perhaps produced by religiously "lay" persons and "included many who were not highly specialized," in contrast to singers, priests, and prophets. A major issue here is the "dimension of life" Buss emphasizes as foundational for study of genres. Rather than focusing on "situations," he emphasizes that any one of three criteria—life process, content, or verbal form—can represent a genre. This means that anything like a greeting, conversation about the weather, death notice, or theology can be a genre. Perhaps Bakhtin's view of "zone," namely, "the locus for hearing a voice," which is "brought about by the voice" (1981:434), is related to Buss's assertions here. Bakhtin thought there were disputed zones, but never empty ones. Thus, people's intentions and speech must pass through zones dominated by other people "and are therefore refracted" (434). Is this what Buss is talking about when he says that culturally significant genres, each representing a dimension of life, "engage metaphorically in a dialogue with one another"? Metaphor, as it is currently understood, is "typically based on cross-domain correlations in our experience, which give rise to the perceived similarities between the two domains within the metaphor" (Lakoff and Johnson 2003:245). Is this what Buss means by genres engaging "metaphorically in a dialogue with one another"?

Holquist does not include "metaphor" in the 1981 Bakhtin glossary or index, nor does it appear in the index of Speech Genres and Other Late Essays or his books on formal method (1978), art (1990), or a philosophy of the act (1993). In fact, it may be the case that a major reason Bakhtin's lexicon dialogicae is not more prominent in current studies of language and literature is the absence of any significant focus on metaphor in the approach. Buss uses the term metaphor, but he does not clarify how he perceives "metaphorical dialogue" to function in this context, nor does he mention that he is reaching beyond Bakhtin's terms of interest when he introduces it into his discussion. Perhaps the reason is that Buss is more interested to assert that "dialogues exist metaphorically within genres," resulting in their not being "internally homogeneous," than to assert the effect of that metaphorical relationship. In the context of recognizing divergences within each genre, Buss suggests that his approach may stand close to Bakhtin's carnival-like interpretation in Rabelais and His World, where there is an interplay between order and disorder. It seems to me that Buss does not develop this further simply because he thinks this is the nature of everyday life. Speech acts and therefore genres, in Buss's view, mix things together, because people engaged in life mix things together. In the process of mixing things together, however, humans give "form" to speech and therefore form to literature. This is indeed very close to Bakhtin's approach. If he were so inclined, Buss could, it seems to me, relate many more aspects of his approach to form, genre, and canon specifically to Bakhtin's lexicon dialogicae than he does in this essay. The issue here, of course, is the effectiveness of using Bakhtin's terminology. Perhaps it is best to appropriate and adapt the concepts of other interpreters rather than to use their specific terminology. This is certainly an issue with Burke's lexis rhetoricae as well as Bakhtin's lexicon dialogicae. It is understandable that Buss considers it more important to explain his approach in relation to the approach of Hermann Gunkel, who was a founder of form criticism in Hebrew Bible studies. Buss significantly tips his hat to Bakhtin in this essay, but he exercises notable restraint in the use of Bakhtin's terminology to explain his approach to form and canon in the Hebrew Bible.

When Carol Newsom discusses genre in her essay, she also exercises restraint in her use of Bakhtinian terminology. When she refers to "genre" at the beginning of her essay, she immediately refers to "genology," a term I have not found in writings attributed to Bakhtin. Observing that Gunkel and other form critics were interested in oral Gattungen, she rightly considers their approach to have some kind of intriguing relation to Bakhtin's reflection on "speech genres." As she moves her reflections to "apocalypse" in biblical studies, she introduces the phrase "metaphors and images" in her discussion of "members of a genre and a genre's boundaries." Citing the work of Jacques Derrida as helpful for thinking of genre in relation to a text's "rhetorical orientation," she introduces Adena Rosmarin's The Power of Genre (1985), which draws on art historian E. H. Gombrich's dictum that "all thinking is sorting, classifying," to assert that "the 'validity' of a genre category has to do with its potential for creating new critical insight rather than with its correspondence to the author's own sense of genre" (Newsom).

Observing that genre recognition involves some sort of "mental grouping of texts," Newsom appeals to Wittgenstein's notion of family resemblance as a bridge to Alastair Fowler's notion of kinds of literature (1982) and Jonathan Culler's notion of intertextuality (1975). In all of this, there is no further reference to Bakhtin. Rather, there is an implication that the issue of genre in relation to a text's rhetorical orientation leads directly from Bakhtin's approach to language and literature to these more recent studies. The goal of
the forward movement of her essay is to arrive at the domain of present-day cognitive theory and to use insights into “prototypes” as they were studied in the 1970s by Eleanor Rosch (1975; 1978). At this point she takes the reader on an intriguing tour of references to “highly typical” and “less typical” apocalypses outside both the Hebrew Bible and New Testament canons, introducing an analogy with members and “quasi-members” of a club to characterize their relation to the “genre” apocalypse. Then, referring to the approach of Michael Sinding (2002), she observes a limit of this approach, since “prototype theory operates ahistorically.” It is “extremely important,” she asserts, that any theory of genre be able to incorporate “historical” information and insight into the genre that is the focus of the study. The case in point is apocalypses, which emerged sometime in the third century B.C.E. and reached their demise within Judaism in the aftermath of the Bar Kokhba revolt, even though they continued to be written in Christian circles.

Only after a rich tour through various theories and texts does Newsom’s essay return to Bakhtin. It might be possible, she suggests, to recast Fowler’s observation of “a process of continuous metamorphosis” within any literary genre in terms of Bakhtin’s “notion of texts as utterances in dialogical relationship to one another.” Calling attention to Bakhtin’s perception of a “profound conservatism” within genres, she cites his dictum that “a genre is always the same and yet not the same, always old and new simultaneously” (Bakhtin 1984:106). Bakhtin’s approach, therefore, brings together the synchronic and diachronic elements of genre. In the end, Newsom concludes that Bakhtin is more suggestive than systematic in his reflections on genre. For this reason, recent cognitive theory, which works with “the mechanisms of mental creativity” and works systematically with “conceptual blending,” is a necessary supplement to Bakhtin’s work. Thus, throughout her essay Newsom prefers to build on insights in the Bakhtin corpus rather than to use terms beyond “speech genre” to discuss the “genology” of apocalypse. At the very end, she introduces the term “chronotope” and proposes that, while it “has mostly been explored in relation to narrative structures, there is no reason why it would not be fruitful for other types of literature.” Thus, chronotope could be another useful concept to use for study of apocalypse, but Newsom leaves its application to the genre apocalypse for another time and place. This is a rich, creative, and highly productive essay, to be sure, focusing on the relation of Bakhtin’s concept of “speech genre” to recent theories of genre and cognitive science. It leaves the reader with intriguing ideas about genre “prototypes” and the possibility of applying the concept of “chronotope” not only to novels but also to apocalypses.

Michael Vines picks up where Newsom ends, with an investigation of “The Apocalyptic Chronotope.” As his essay proceeds, it discusses genre, chronotope, and architectonic form in Bakhtin’s lexicon dialogicae and adds a new term, “form-shaping ideology,” which appears to have been coined in the essays in Mikhail Bakhtin: Creation of a Prosaics (1990:367). The underlying premises of this essay reside in a blending of M. M. Bakhtin/P. N. Medvedev, The Formal Method in Literary Scholarship (1978) with M. M. Bakhtin, Art and Answerability (1990), neither of which Vines cited in the version sent to me for review. This means that, while the essay features “chronotope,” which is highly important in The Dialogic Imagination (1981:84–258) and Speech Genres and Other Late Essays (1986:25–54), the philosophical underpinnings for the argument lie in two books that do not contain the word chronotope in their index. The approach Vines presents merges the sharply defined “critical sociological poetics” in The Formal Method with aspects of the two major sections of Art and Answerability: “Author and Hero in Aesthetic Activity” (4–256) and “Supplement: The Problem of Content, Material, and Form in Verbal Art” (257–325). In other words, rather than being guided by a definition of ideology as “simply an idea-system” that is “semiotic in the sense that it involves the concrete exchange of signs in society and in history” so that “[e]very speaker ... is an ideologue and every utterance an ideologue” (Bakhtin 1981:429), Vines’s essay is guided by a critical sociological poetic that emphasizes “the distinctive features of the material, forms, and purposes of each area of ideological creation,” whether that area is “art, science, ethics, or religion” (Bakhtin/Medvedev 1978:3). In the essay, Vines prefers the terminology in the “Supplement” (Bakhtin 1990:257–325), where the word “content” replaces the word “purposes.”

Thus, when Vines refers to “architectonic form,” his assertions relate to Bakhtin/Medvedev’s comments about “the constructive unity of the work” that makes a work of art “a closed spatial body” (1978:45–46), but he uses the language of the work’s “unification and organization of cognitive and ethical values” from Art and Answerability (1990:304). Arguing against “material aesthetics,” Bakhtin/Medvedev asserted: “Architectonic forms are forms of the inner and bodily value of aesthetic man, they are forms of nature—as his environment, forms of the event in his individual-experiential, social, and historical dimensions, and so on” (1990:270). Here there is an argument for a bodily aesthetics as an alternative to material aesthetics, although I cannot find any place where the phrase “bodily aesthetics” actually appears to describe it. The argument does, it seems to me, bring the presentation very close to assertions by the conceptual metaphor theorist Mark Johnson in his book The Body in the Mind (1987). If so, this provides an important link between Bakhtin/Medvedev’s work and some of the most exciting and potentially fruitful work in recent conceptual metaphor and conceptual integration (blending) theory (e.g., Fauconnier and Turner 2002; Lakoff and Johnson 2003:243–76).
When Vines introduces the phrase “form-shaping ideology,” he is communicating Bakhtin/Medvedev’s assertion that “the ideological horizon is constantly generating. And this generation, like all generation, is a dialectical process.... The artistic work ... is penetrated by and absorbs some elements of the ideological environment and turns away other elements external to it” (1978:154). In this context, what Vines calls “an internal aspect” and “an external aspect” are translated as “intrinsic” and “extrinsic,” with the assertion that “in the process of history, extrinsic and intrinsic dialectically change places, and, of course, do not remain unchanged as they do” (154). Vines’s phrase “form-shaping ideology” substitutes “ideology” for Bakhtin’s “author” when Bakhtin asserts that “An author is the uniquely active form-giving energy that is manifested not in a psychologically conceived consciousness, but in a durably valid cultural product, and his active, productive reaction is manifested in the structures it generates” (1990:8). Vines’s depersonalization of the author into “form-shaping ideology” is a blending that overmaps the presentation in Art and Answerability with the philosophical argument in The Formal Method. The result is a Bakhtin that readers regularly do not see. We have not seen the Bakhtin Vines presents, because his “Bakhtin” is a blend of Medvedev and Bakhtin that gives priority to the philosophical hermeneutics in The Formal Method rather than the dialogical hermeneutics in The Dialogic Imagination.

When Vines introduces chronotope, the emphasis is related to Bakhtin/Medvedev’s assertion: “The goal of the artistic structure of every historical genre is to merge the distances of space and time with the contemporary by the force of the all-penetrating social evaluation” (1978:158). Vines could have helped his readers by discussing the emphasis on “social evaluation” in The Formal Method. In that work, “social evaluation” is “the element which unites the material presence of the word with its meaning” (149). For Bakhtin/Medvedev, social evaluation is the primary dimension missing from the history of interpretation of literature and art. Since “[e]very concrete utterance is a social act” (120), “[s]ocial evaluation actualizes the utterance both from the standpoint of its factual presence and the standpoint of its semantic meaning” (121).

The philosophical grounding of the “special” Bakhtinian assertions about genre that Vines presents in his essay, therefore, is to be found in the presentation of literature as “a three-dimensional constructive whole” (1987:130). In The Formal Method, these dimensions are called “forms, means, and concrete conditions of communication” (152). In Art and Answerability, “forms” becomes “form,” “means” becomes “content,” and “concrete conditions of communication” becomes “material.” Vines has chosen the singular terms form, content, and material rather than the plural terms forms, means, and material conditions of communication. This becomes very important as Vines moves to his emphasis on “meta-linguistic form,” “architectonic form,” “form-shaping ideology,” “chronotope,” “genre,” and “essential unity,” all of which are singular constructs. In highly important ways, Vines’s essay leaves behind the plurality of Bakhtin’s heteroglossia and dialogism to present “singular” concepts that guide the reader’s understanding toward the chronotope that presents the essential unity of the genre of apocalyptic.

This means that the reader yearns to see more of Bakhtin’s dialogism as Vines’s essay unfolds (cf. Gowler). But the absence of a discussion of the dialogic nature of apocalyptic is not just an oversight. Vines thinks only modern writings are truly dialogical. In contrast, ancient works “remain essentially monologic, since the values of the author control the representation of the dialogic voices within the text and distort their perspective on life.” The control about which Vines speaks is activated by the author in the context of an “external” ideological environment in which the author performs the ideological artistic act of constructing the literary work. The act of constructing the work produces a dynamic merger of form, content, and material (all singulars) that produce an essential unity.

Vines would have done well in his essay to use Bakhtin’s distinction between primary and secondary genres (1986:62), which he explains very adroitly in his earlier work on Markan genre (Vines 2002:55). Apocalypse, in Bakhtin’s system, seems quite clearly to be a secondary genre, at least when it began during the third and second centuries B.C.E. This means that apocalypse is derivative of one or more primary genres, “formed through the incorporation and modification of various types of speech genres for specific purposes” (Vines 2002:55). In the context of a secondary genre, each primary genre “serves a more complex ideological function than the one it once had in everyday speech. Within the secondary genre, it functions as an indirect indicator of condensed social evaluations” (55; cf. Bakhtin 1986:62).

Vines makes excellent observations about the relation of biblical prophecy to apocalypse. He observes that both types of literature are “clearly revelatory and concerned with bringing a divine perspective to bear on the human condition.” Also, he observes that both include “the fantastic” in a context where temporal and spatial boundaries are permeable. Then he astutely observes three differences: (1) the prophetic hero is active; the apocalyptic hero is passive; (2) prophetic tests the faithfulness of the prophet to confront a hostile audience with the word of God, while apocalyptic tests the cosmos in the context of the witness and internalization of the revelation by the apocalyptic seer; and (3) prophetic alternates between fantastic and realistic, while apocalyptic is more firmly rooted in the fantastic and the supernatural. Does this
mean that prophetic is “serving a more ideological function” in a “secondary” genre, namely, apocalyptic?

Vines should have supplemented his excellent comparison of prophetic and apocalyptic with a comparison of speculative wisdom and apocalyptic. Students of apocalyptic know that recent scholarship not only observes a relation of apocalyptic to prophetic but also to wisdom (Wright and Wills 2005). Speculative wisdom also is significantly revelatory and concerned to bring a divine perspective to bear on the human condition. Also, its spatial and temporal boundaries are significantly permeable. What is the relation of the speculative sapiential hero to the prophetic and apocalyptic hero? What is the nature of test in speculative wisdom? What is the nature of the fantastic in relation to the realistic in speculative wisdom?

Do prophetic and wisdom function as “primary genres” in the secondary genre of apocalypse? Or have prophetic and wisdom become secondary genres in the context of apocalypse as a primary genre? Perhaps this could improve Vines’s discussion of what John Collins calls Type I apocalypses (mystical visions) and Type II apocalypses (heavenly journeys). Vines asserts that the differences between the two types “appears to be only formal” in a context where they share the same “chronotope.” Therefore, they belong to the same genre: apocalypse. Could a broader approach to apocalyptic, which has an eye both on prophetic and wisdom in apocalyptic, help with this analysis? Could Type I apocalypse (mystical vision) be a blend of visions both by prophets and speculative sages? Do both prophetic and wisdom function as secondary genres in Type I apocalyptic, or is Type I apocalyptic a secondary genre in which primary prophetic and wisdom genres function more ideologically than they conventionally did in Israelite culture? Alternatively, does prophetic journeying function as a secondary genre in Type II apocalyptic, or is Type II apocalyptic a secondary genre in which prophetic journeying and speculative wisdom function more ideologically than they conventionally did in Israelite culture?

One of the questions here is if a primary genre is a genre that has become “culturally conventional.” Once a genre has become “primary,” namely, culturally conventional, is it available for a more ideological use in a new, “secondary” genre? When a secondary genre has existed for a century or more, can it become “culturally conventional,” namely, a “primary” genre? This takes us back to Newsom’s essay on genre and prototype theory. When Ezekiel, 1 Enoch, and Daniel were written, were they “secondary apocalyptic genre” that functioned as “atypical prophetic literature”? When the Revelation to John became culturally conventional (a “primary” genre) in Christianity, did this make Ezekiel, 1 Enoch, and Daniel “typical apocalyptic literature”? Does 1 Enoch at some point become a “primary” genre after the emergence of the Revelation to John? The point, so well made by most of the authors of this volume, is that genre is both a diachronic and synchronic interpretive category. This means that it is necessary to maintain a dialogic relation between diachronicity and synchronicity in our discussions of genre. Vines’s essay gives new life in many ways to genre analysis of apocalypse. Maintaining more of Bakhtin’s dialogism through analysis of the ways in which speech genres function culturally and ideologically in apocalypses might help us to build on his initial steps in ways that enable us to explain more successfully the remarkably complex relationships among different kinds of literature in the environment of biblical studies. The issue, however, is how Bakhtin understood dialogism in relation to chronotopes, and this leads us to the next essay.

Christopher Fuller discusses chronotopes in relation to the genealogy in Matt 1:1–17. He begins with a clarification that, for Bakhtin, chronotopes are not dialogical internally in the represented world of the work (Bakhtin 1981:252). Their function as “organizing centers” for a narrative “materializes” time and space in “the represented world of the text” in a manner that is primarily monological. A chronotope functions dialogically in relation to worlds outside the text, namely, the world of the reader and the “creating world” that emerges “to readers within different contexts and different historical periods.” Fuller’s phrase “creating world” is shorthand for Bakhtin’s “special creative chronotope inside which th[e] exchange between work and life occurs, and which constitutes the distinctive life of the work” (1981:254). One of the keys to Fuller’s approach is the concept of a genre as “a form of thinking.” Another is a concept from the work of Jay Ladin of “local chronotopes” (1999). Fuller’s procedure is to analyze and interpret dialogical relationships between the Matthean genealogy as a local chronotope and other local chronotopes.

Fuller begins with an analysis of the temporal nature of the Matthean genealogy, namely, its linear progression from Abraham to the Messiah of Israel. Since this feature is present in the internal wording of the genealogy, his interpretation, as he says, does not argue for anything “that is foreign to standard scholarship on Matthew’s genealogy.” When he proceeds to the chronotopic focus on space, which “Matthean scholars have ignored,” he does not tell the reader that scholars have ignored the spaces to which he points because these spaces exist in worlds “external” to the words in the text he is interpreting. Only one of the spaces is internal to the wording of the Matthean genealogy: the deportation of Israel to Babylonia (Matt 1:11–12, 17). All the other spaces (the movement of Abraham to another land, the movement of Judah and his brothers to Egypt, the desert wanderings, entry into the Holy Land, settling in Bethlehem, and Jerusalem becoming the capital of the kingdom of Israel and the location for the First and Second
Temples) are external to its wording. Thus the spatial dimensions Fuller cites, except for the deportation to Babylon, are all “intertextual” rather than “intrapetual,” residing in potential “local chronotopes” either in the world of the reader or in the creating world that lies between the reader and the text. It would be interesting to hear a discussion of the possibility that the one spatial reference, namely, to the deportation, encourages the reader to engage in dialogical conceptuality of the other spaces Fuller evokes in his interpretation of the Matthean genealogy.

For Fuller, the possibility that the Matthean genealogy can function as a local chronotope that exists in a dialogical relation to other local chronotopes both in Matthew and outside it lies in the relationship of genres, chronotopes, and utterances to memory. For Bakhtin, Fuller asserts, genre is “a form of thinking.” Genres are forms of thinking, chronotopes in genres are special ways of thinking about time and space, and utterances are the speech genres that create genres and chronotopes. This means that genres, chronotopes, and utterances bear “the memory of their prior use whenever they are employed in other contexts.” Here it is important to notice the internal dialogue in the approach between the personification of genre, chronotope, and utterance and the depersonalization of authors as form-shaping ideologies. Underlying Bakhtin’s approach is a dialogism between social evaluation that is so deeply embedded in words, works, and genres that there is no way justifiably to escape their “bodily conceptuality” (my terminology) and ideology that depersonalizes authors into form, content, and material.

The bodiness of genres, chronotopes, and utterances means, for Bakhtin, that they not only think, but they also bear memories of their prior use. Fuller uses this memory to argue for “eschatological satire” in the Matthean genealogy. The Matthean genealogy includes four women for the purpose of subverting primogeniture. This act of subversion is a way of inviting “the reader to reevaluate other matters alluded to in the genealogy such as the chronotopic relationships between salvation history, land and temple.” Like Bakhtin’s menippean satire (1984:147), “[s]candal, eccentricity, impropiety, and cultural contravention are all present in Matthew’s genealogy when it is read ‘like’ Bakhtin.” This satire does not produce laughter, however, but “an overturning of cultural and narrative expectations through the active participation of the reader.” It is eschatological satire, akin in many ways to Bakhtin’s concept of the carnivalesque.

In the end, Fuller’s essay uses not only Bakhtin’s works but interpretations of Bakhtin’s work to introduce a number of additional terms or phrases into a Bakhtinian lexicon dialogicae for biblical study: local chronotope, creating world, form-shaping ideology, genre as a form of thinking, memory, and eschatological satire. One of the questions Fuller leaves unaddressed is the relation of the local chronotope in the Matthean genealogy to other local chronotopes in Matthew. On the one hand, Fuller implies that the eschatological satire present in the local chronotope in the genealogy echoes throughout the remainder of the First Gospel. This could mean that the genealogy is a microcosm of the chronotope that unifies the overall Gospel of Matthew. This view would cohere with Bakhtin’s assertion that chronotopes are not dialogical in the represented world of the text. On the other hand, Fuller asserts that local chronotopes are present in “forms” like the genealogy. Since local chronotopes exist in dialogical relationships to one another, is it possible that other forms in Matthew contain alternative local chronotopes that introduce dialogism into the represented world in Matthew? If this is possible, it could mean that Jay Ladin’s view of local chronotope introduces the possibility of types of chronotopic dialogicism in the represented world of the text of a work that conflicts with Bakhtin’s assertions about chronotopes. Bakhtin strongly asserts that, while chronotopes exist in dialogical relationships to one another, “this dialogue cannot enter into the world represented in the work, nor into any of the chronotopes represented in it; it is outside the world represented, although not outside the work as a whole. It [this dialogue] enters the world of the author, of the performer, and the world of the listeners and readers. And all these worlds are chronotopic as well” (1981:252). Where does this leave us with the concept of “local chronotope”? It is clear that biblical interpreters, who have been trained in source, form, and tradition criticism, may want “local chronotopes” that have dialogical relationships to one another within the represented world of a work. But this appears not to be what Bakhtin saw. Vines’s assertion in the previous essay about Bakhtin’s perception, that there is only one chronotope in the represented world of a work, appears to present Bakhtin’s view correctly. What, then, is the relation of multiple “local chronotopes” to one another in the represented world of a work? Are all of them, with the memories they bear, submissive to the chronotope that unifies the work? It appears that evoking the “memories” of each local chronotope introduces both the world outside the text and the “creating world” of readers. It appears that, for Bakhtin, the represented world of a work contains “a chronotope,” which would mean that all local chronotopes exist outside the world of the represented text. Are some modern interpreters questioning this conclusion by Bakhtin through a concept of “local chronotope”? Or do those who use the concept keep it thoroughly within Bakhtin’s system? More extended use of the concept by interpreters will tell us if perhaps this is a post-Bakhtinian way to introduce dialogism into a chronotope in the represented world of a work, where Bakhtin did not think it was present.

Paul N. Anderson discusses aspects of Bakhtin’s dialogism in the initial pages of his essay, refers to Bakhtin periodically in the sections on the rhe-
In the end, the reader can express gratitude to Anderson for his energetic, perceptive work on the Johannine misunderstanding dialogues and encourage him to reconfigure his remarkable knowledge about Johannine scholarship for readers by employing multiple insights from Bakhtin about novels of the First Stylistic Line (the Sentimental novel, 1981:400) and the Second Stylistic Line (the picaresque adventure novel, 1981:406). Anderson's keen eye has located a very important "touch point" for analysis and interpretation of the Gospel of John in Bakhtin's contrast between these two "Stylistic Lines" of novel. Those of us interested in Bakhtinian readings of New Testament writings look forward, either from Anderson or someone else, to a programmatic reading of aspects of the Gospel of John that builds on the beginning points about Bakhtin's two alternative Stylistic Lines of novel that Anderson introduces in this study of the challenge to "privileged, authoritative" discourse in the Johannine misunderstanding dialogues.

Bula Maddison brings the volume to a conclusion with a stunning Bakhtinian analysis of Toni Morrison's *The Beloved*. Building on insights into double-voicedness, the inherent dialogism in the word (Bakhtin 1981:294), and heteroglossia, which she calls conversation between languages or language-worlds (291), she analyzes "dialogized heteroglossia," which occurs through "interanimation" (295–96). Bypassing debates about whether chronotopes can be dialogical within the represented world in the text, she points to Bakhtin's discussion of hybridization (305–15, 358–71) as a way to talk about four or more languages or belief systems that can be revised and shaped and reshaped in a novel as they contend with one another. By my count, she discusses six languages in *The Beloved*, which participate in two kinds of time—conventional time: (1) the Bible; (2) the African American slave narrative; and (3) the conventional love story; and cyclical African and African American time: (4) the spirit world of African cosmology; (5) the African American mythic origin story in the biblical exodus and conquest; and (6) the watery creation story. These six languages contend with one another over "the politics of fulfillment" (conventional time) and "the African chronotope of rememory" (cyclical time) in a dialogue between "liberation story" and "apocalypse."

In contrast to Josef Pesch's view of *The Beloved* as a postapocalyptic novel, Maddison views it as a hybrid in which two chronotopes contend in a context where the apocalypse happened before (eighteen years ago) and "the four horsemen might ride up again" any time. Her thesis is that "the spatialization of time" in the novel has many languages or language-worlds (heteroglossia: perhaps six) within two contending chronotopes. The force of her essay in this volume is to press the issue whether more than one chronotope exists in works in the New Testament, especially when so many of...
them not only contain allusions but also extensive quotations of entire lines from "scripture." In fact, the analysis might raise the specific question if some kind of cyclical time is at work in some of the "language-worlds" of the Bible. Perhaps, for example, the idea of a new Moses or a new Elijah is the result of two chronotopes, one of a "prophetic politics of fulfillment" and another of a "cyclical prophetic language," contending with one another in the context of multiple "biblical" and "extrabiblical" languages in the Mediterranean world. Perhaps earlier discussions in biblical interpretation about type and antitype were a way of talking about relationships among characters and events that exist in contending conceptualities of space and time, and in multiple languages and language-worlds. And perhaps references to "allegory" were yet another way. Is it the case, then, that only the modern novel and works contemporary with it contain pervasive dialogism and heteroglossia? Or is there pervasive dialogism and heteroglossia especially, perhaps, in deuterocanonical, pseudepigraphical, and New Testament literature during the Hellenistic-Roman period?

Whether biblical interpreters are able to answer these questions correctly or not, this volume of essays can help them to enrich their interpretational strategies and insights with the aid of insights from the works of Bakhtin. One of the major achievements is to help the reader to have a significant understanding of terms and phrases that are central to the Bakhtinian lexicon dialogicae beyond the well-known language of dialogism and heteroglossia. This includes, as they appear in alphabetical order in the glossary of The Dialogical Imagination (1981:423–34), the concepts of authoritative (privileged) discourse, belief system, canonization, centripetal-centrifugal, chronotope, completed (finalization), dialogue, ennobled discourse, everyday life, genre, hybrid, ideology, interanimation (interillumination), language, monoglossia, polyglossia, refraction, speech, utterance, voice, and zone. It also includes additional Bakhtinian concepts such as speech genres, double-voicedness, architectonic form, carnivalesque, primary and secondary genres, world represented in the work, world outside the work, memory, First and Second Stylized Line novels, and dialogized heteroglossia. Then there are terms and phrases interpreters have crafted to clarify and build upon Bakhtin's hermeneutical system, such as form-shaping ideology, creating world, and local chronotopes. To these, authors of the essays in this volume have added words and phrases they consider to be related to Bakhtin's way of interpreting literature, such as genology, prototype theory, bodily aesthetics, eschatological satire, rememory, and the politics of fulfillment. This makes more than forty terms for a person to learn as a way of giving new energy to their strategies and conceptualities of interpretation. Kenneth Burke, as we recall, used thirty-nine words and phrases to construct his chapter on a lexicon rhetoricae for his
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