HER MASTER'S TOOLS?
Feminist and Postcolonial Engagements of Historical-Critical Discourse

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Caroline Vander Stichele and Todd Penner

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to think out the character of a historical-critical postcolonialism. Even if the costs of a historical-critical postcolonialism will be the temporary and local occlusion of some types of knowledges, or the limitation of some rationalities that are not able to claim space in an essentially post-Enlightenment discourse, the benefit of a historical-critical stance that produces an account of "other" humans—preserving a substantial measure of their particularity—will make the endeavor worthwhile. The methodological elaboration of historical-critical method seeks to halt the tendency to remake the past in our own image. Historical criticism attempts to circumscribe a forum for intersubjective discussions—which, in the study of religion, is crucially important—and this forum, in turn, creates a discourse that is not bound to a particular confessional context. Such a claim needs to be distinguished sharply from any claim to a universal context of discourse (principle six above is crucial in this respect). More than any discourse on ancient religion, historical-critical work provides materials that can anchor a critique of current practices in the field. It is the methodological rigor with which historical criticism ideally operates that gives it the ability to make its account of otherness convincing and human. The master’s house is being dismantled from several sides and the master’s tools are constantly being redeployed. Although feminist and postcolonial efforts of dismantling have not always been complimentary, historical-critical work on the ancient world can be a particularly fertile site for methodological cooperation.

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THE RHETORICAL FULL-TURN IN BIBLICAL INTERPRETATION AND ITS RELEVANCE FOR FEMINIST HERMENEUTICS*

Vernon K. Robbins

In her address at the Rhetoric and Religion Conference held at the University of South Africa, Pretoria (August, 1994), Elisabeth Schüssler Fiorenza asserted that those who have reintroduced rhetoric into biblical interpretation during the last quarter of a century have “become stuck in a rhetorical half-turn.”¹ Recently, her essay has been republished in Rhetoric and Ethic: The Politics of Biblical Studies.² Her assertion is that in the context of the revival of rhetorical criticism “biblical scholarship has not yet made the full epistemological turn to a rhetoric of inquiry insofar as it has barely recognized the contributions which feminist and liberationist scholarship have made to the New Rhetoric.”³

Schüssler Fiorenza proposes both a rationale and a justification for the rationale in order to explain the situation. The reason rhetorical biblical scholarship has not incorporated feminist and liberationist scholarship,

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she asserts, is that interpreters remain in "captivity" to "empiricist-
positivist science." This captivity takes the form of expending much
"energy in applying and reinscribing to Christian Testament texts ancient
rhetorical methods, disciplinary technology, terminological stylistics and
the scattered prescription of oratorical handbooks in antiquity."4 Later in
the essay she proposes a reason for this captivity: Rhetorical interpreters,
she asserts, find themselves unable or unwilling to acknowledge "their
feminist and liberationist critical partners" because of "the contested
character of the field" of rhetorical studies. She suggests it is "the fear
that they could be seen as 'unscholarly' [that] prevents engagement with
such critical political intellectual discourses."5

Schüssler Fiorenza continues her Pretoria essay with a critical dis-
cussion of socio-rhetorical interpretation, since it "is one of the few
Christian Testament studies that attempts to take rhetorical and feminist
theoretical insights seriously."6 As she proceeds, her stated goal is "to illustrate
how even a socio-rhetorical analysis that is aware of gender studies in the end
resorts to a positivist social-scientific approach in order to validate its
interpretation in terms of the logic of identity as the best reading and
'reliable scientific interpretation.'7 When Schüssler Fiorenza wrote this in
1994, she did not have my Tapestry of Early Christian Discourse8 to consult,
and I have acknowledged this in my response to her criticisms at the 1998
Florence Rhetoric Conference.9 She did not, however, revise her response in
the 1999 republication of the essay. As a result, her description does not
fully apply to the strategies I use in socio-rhetorical interpretation and
the goals I have for those strategies.

Schüssler Fiorenza's description was based on a perception that
socio-rhetorical interpretation "discusses rhetorical, literary, social-scientif-
ic, and ideological approaches as separate methodological investigative
procedures."10 It is true that I did not explicitly draw these procedures
together in my earlier work. However, the goal of my approach has been,

and is, to use an interpretive analytics that brings disciplines together
rather than one that drives them apart. Indeed, the overall goal of my
interpretive strategy is to undertake a full-formed rhetoric of inquiry in
the field of biblical studies. Such an approach is not new, of course, as the
basic strategies of an interpretive analytics emerge from the work of
Michel Foucault: "An interpretive analytics approaches texts as discourse
and 'sees discourse as part of a larger field of power and practice whose
relations are articulated in different ways by different paradigms'./1 According
to Dreyfus and Rabinow, an interpretive analytics moves through three steps:

1) [The interpreter must take up a pragmatic stance on the basis of some
socially shared sense of how things are going; 2) the investigator must
produce a disciplined diagnosis of what has gone on and is going on in
the social body to account for the shared sense of distress or well-being;
3) the investigator owes the reader an account of why the practices he
[or she] describes should produce the shared malaise or contentment
which gave rise to the investigation.]12

The sense of distress in the social body of biblical interpretation that I
addressed in 1996 was the dividing of exegetical strategies into separate
methodological investigative procedures. Thus, Schüssler Fiorenza has
not acknowledged the manner in which socio-rhetorical interpretation
directly confronts the problem of methodological division that she herself
also dislikes. One of the results of the division of exegetical strategies was
and is the isolation of feminist studies from various arenas of biblical
interpretation. One of the goals of my interpretive analytics was and con-
tinues to be to articulate how feminist studies and other developing
modes of interpretation are internal participants in the movement of bib-
lical studies toward a new paradigm.13

THE LOCATION OF SOCIO-RHETORICAL
INTERPRETATION IN TRANSMODERNISM

It may be helpful at the outset to explain, as I understand it, the
philosophical location and ideology of socio-rhetorical interpretation. The

4. Schüssler Fiorenza, "Challenging the Rhetorical Half-Turn," 32; and idem, Rhetoric
and Ethic, 86.
5. Schüssler Fiorenza, "Challenging the Rhetorical Half-Turn," 47; and idem, Rhetoric
and Ethic, 97.
6. Schüssler Fiorenza, "Challenging the Rhetorical Half-Turn," 33; and idem, Rhetoric
and Ethic, 86.
7. Schüssler Fiorenza, "Challenging the Rhetorical Half-Turn," 33; and idem, Rhetoric
and Ethic, 87.
8. Vernon K. Robbins, The Tapestry of Early Christian Discourse: Rhetoric, Society and Ide-
10. Schüssler Fiorenza, "Challenging the Rhetorical Half-Turn," 33; and idem, Rhetoric
and Ethic, 87.
11. Robbins, Tapestry of Early Christian Discourse, 12, quoting Hubert L. Dreyfus and
Paul Rabinow, Michel Foucault: Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics (Chicago: University
12. Robbins, Tapestry of Early Christian Discourse, 12, quoting Dreyfus and Rabinow,
Michel Foucault, 201.
13. To this end, writings by twenty-one women appear in the bibliography of Robbins,
Tapestry of Early Christian Discourse, which was published in 1996.
philosophical ideology of socio-rhetorical interpretation is most appropriately identified as relational transmodernism. On the one hand, this ideology is an alternative to particularist modernism. On the other, it represents an alternative to antimodernism and ultramodernism. With the triumph of historicism in biblical interpretation between 1775-1875, particularist modernity began to drive biblical exegesis. Freedom entailed a relocation of authority and historical criticism was its champion. Rejecting Aristotle’s concept of form as a designation of essence, philosophers treated form as an external, sensuously perceived, aspect of existence. In this context, biblical interpreters valued particularist and individualist phenomena. Content (Inhalt) was separated from other aspects of form, and individualistic interpretation guided the reconstruction of sources. The feminist hermeneutics of Schüssler Fiorenza has continued in the tradition of a relocation of authority nurtured by modernism. Her approach combines historical criticism with a rhetorical hermeneutics of suspicion and thereby functions to relocate the authority of male-stream interpretation. As a result of the merger of modernist and antimodernist strategies in its procedures, it is difficult for this approach to enact a rhetorical full-turn in biblical interpretation.

According to Martin J. Buss, postmodern approaches began to emerge after 1875 and have only gradually found their way into biblical studies. Three major postmodern lines, he asserts, functioned alongside one another during the twentieth century: antimodern, transmodern, and ultramodern. As Buss defines them, the antimodern line “opposes the disorderliness that is inherent in modernity, especially individualism and a strong sense of historical change.” The transmodern line believes that major features of modernity are valuable “but problematic when they are emphasized one-sidedly.” The ultramodern line attempts to eliminate generality, moving “from moderate nominalism to extreme nominalism” into “skepticism or nihilism, especially when held without a belief in God.” In terms of my interests here, the emergence of relationalism as a new paradigm in the transmodern line is particularly noteworthy. In Buss’s words:

According to this theory, ... relations, which can recur, are real. At the same time, the theory holds that the particular objects, the items that stand in relations, are also real, even to the extent of having a semi-independent existence, for real relations must have endpoints with some independence, so that they are not simply absorbed into a larger whole. Thus it is said that relations “both combine and separate.”

Buss contrasts relationalism, on the one hand, to nominalism, which can handle only the extremes: “monadism (radical pluralism) and monism (tight connectivity within a large unit).” On the other hand, essentialism “considers some associations as necessary (‘essential’) and others as accidental.” Relationists replace a theory of causality with a notion of probability, including both conditional probability and correlation. In this context, a new paradigm emerges for form: “Form is held ... to be a complex of relations which are shared (at least potentially) with some other existents and can thus be understood, but which together form a whole that evades complete understanding; for, since relations even within a whole require some distancing between the items related, a real whole cannot be completely unified.”

For socio-rhetorical interpretation, the following conclusion is central:

Since relationalism (like nominalism) makes no distinction between essential and accidental features, a given object can be classified in terms of several different forms, according to one’s principle of selectivity, which depends on one’s purpose. However, while nominalism holds that a
form or structure is in the mind of the observer rather than in the object, relationism holds that form emerges interactively as an aspect of a reality revealed to a subject with its questions, thus formed cooperatively by object and observer.24

The statement that “form emerges interactively” is especially important for sociorhetorical interpretation since this approach is an “interactive” mode of interpretation, always perceiving “form” to be “an aspect of reality revealed to a subject with its questions, thus formed cooperatively by object and observer.” This principle means, in fact, that the best sociorhetorical interpretation results from scholarly collaboration. When a group of specialists work together in a sustained manner to interpret a set of texts they perceive to be “somehow related,” the “interactive” product regularly is an exhibition of “forms” that interpreters are enabled, through interactive interpretation, to see and communicate to others.

One of the most important presentations of “transmodern” thought, and one in which the term is specifically used, is Couze Venn’s Occidentalism: Modernity and Subjectivity.25 In this essay I make extensive use of this book to present a full rhetorical turn in biblical interpretation. A major goal of Venn’s book is “to subvert the conventional opposition between a philosophy of experience and a philosophy of concept” by refiguring historicity and transforming the discussion of subjectivity into intersubjectivity.26 Focusing on both the materiality and sociality of the world we inherit, inhabit, and transform, Venn emphasizes that we learn to dwell in this world by relying on the hospitality of those closest to us and on order in the surrounding world, the regularities of which we can learn through an apprenticeship. Language is central in this process ..., and thus, crucially, the relation to the other. This involves both the culturally normed mode of this relation and what Levinas calls the face relation.... So apprenticeship involves a way of learning to be ethical beings, at the same time as one learns to be a particular subject and to act on the world according to particular technologies of transforming and appropriating the world, that is to say, apprenticeship instructs us into the ways of coupling with the objectal and inter-subjective worlds in which we dwell.27

An implication of this approach is that the most mature human being is not an isolated, autonomous being but one who engages continually in interhuman apprenticeship in the world one inherits, inhabits, and transforms.28 This apprenticeship “includes learning to deal in culturally specific ways with both the liminal and the material side of beingness, so that we learn to figure and refigure our experiences, and so give meaning to them, in terms of a whole set of rules and stories, beliefs and values inscribed in performative as well as in reflexive practices of becoming instituting particular subjectivities.”29

This focus on continual interhuman and interobjectual apprenticeship is central to sociorhetorical interpretation. Analysis and interpretation is an ongoing process of learning, because “the world of other bodies and the world of objects constitute the ‘dwelling’ for subjectivity.”30 Venn uses the notion of choreography to describe our manner of working with others in contexts of hospitality, generosity, pleasure, suffering, mourning, “attachment, mingling the time of the body with the ‘time of the soul’.”31 Since “[t]he models for the employment of experience already exist in the culture ... they circumscribe the discursive and ‘textual’ world from which we draw in order to question ourselves regarding the meaning of our experiences, and to rectify our ‘selves,’ since the subject is always in process.”32 Analysis and interpretation, then, are journeys of intersubjective “being-with and being-towards the other.”33 Sociorhetorical interpretation invites a commentator into an ongoing journey through multiple textures, social systems, cultures, ideologies, and discourses, for the purposes of redrawing, re(con)figuring, and transfiguring intersubjective boundaries of understanding. This transmodern nature of the journey emphasizes its continual movement. It is not a matter of posturing one’s analysis and interpretation against modernism in a manner that creates new polarities or binaries, but a matter of working through alternatives that modernism, feminism, postmodernism, poststructuralism, postdeconstruction, and postcolonialism have made accessible to us. Sociorhetorical interpretation as an interpretive analytics introduces choreographies for translocalional, 

24. Ibid.
26. Ibid., 33.
27. Ibid., 33-34 (emphasis original).
29. Venn, Occidentalism, 35.
30. Ibid., 42.
32. Venn, Occidentalism, 43.
33. Ibid., 11.
Oppositional Rhetoric as a Half-Turn

In her Pretoria essay, Schüssler Fiorenza describes the task of rhetorical biblical scholarship in the following manner: "How meaning is constructed depends not only on how one reads the social, cultural, and religious markers inscribed by the text but also on what kind of 'intertexts,' preconstructed 'frames of meaning,' common sense understandings, and 'reading paradigms' one utilizes when interpreting linguistic markers and textualized symbols."\(^{34}\) I agree fully with this description of our task. In the essay, she refers to her book *Discipleship of Equals* and calls for "a political rhetoric of inquiry in biblical studies" grounded in "the ekklesia as the public assembly of free and equal citizens in the power of the Spirit."\(^{35}\) Yet, instead of enacting a procedure of "equality" that would have invited a full rhetorical turn in an assessment of the contexts of interpretation for analyzing and interpreting the various versions of the story of the woman who anointed Jesus, for example, Schüssler Fiorenza uses oppositional rhetoric containing inner attributes of domination and separation.\(^{36}\) Characterizing my work as objectivist, scientific, empiricist, and male-stream,\(^{37}\) in contrast to her work as open, free, and based on equality, she took a political half-turn that set her work in opposition to mine in a manner that did not invite further deliberation about the issues involved.

Thus, there is substantive disjunction in Schüssler Fiorenza's Pretoria essay between what she says and what she does. She says many excellent things about the manner in which rhetorical scholarship should proceed, but her discourse enacts an oppositional mode of rhetorical argumentation that would appear to conflict with the openness, freedom, and equality that she establishes as her modus operandi. The issue is what kind of full rhetorical turn we can make as we construct a context of interpretation for a particular text. The scholarly issues at stake become lost when oppositional rhetoric dominates. Schüssler Fiorenza claims a goal of enabling "biblical scholars to investigate the discursive arguments, which perform particular kinds of actions in particular historical situations and at particular political sites."\(^{38}\) I agree with this aim. The question, then, is the particular historical situation and political site that caused Schüssler Fiorenza to use oppositional rhetoric in her essay rather than a rhetoric that would invite discussion and debate among equals.

Schüssler Fiorenza's adoption of oppositional rhetoric as a preferred mode of discourse in a context where she was pleading for a full-turn in rhetorical biblical scholarship presents an opportunity to reflect on the nature of oppositional rhetoric not only in our own personal discourse but also in New Testament discourse more generally. Stephen D. Moore has made the point that as we interpret literature we reenact certain rhetorical practices present in that literature.\(^{39}\) Feminist scholars have helped us to understand how easy it is to reenact certain male rhetorical practices in the literature we interpret. It is also just as easy for feminist interpreters themselves to reenact oppositional rhetoric in biblical literature. In an address I delivered at the University of Stellenbosch at the Second African Symposium on Rhetoric (July 1996), I briefly described oppositional rhetoric in the New Testament as follows:

Central to opposition discourse is the reasoning that people to whom God has given a tradition of salvation in the past currently enact a misunderstanding of God's saving action that must be attacked and replaced by an alternative system of belief and behavior... It presupposes an alignment of the speaker with God, against people who claim to understand God who really do not know the will and the ways of God.\(^{40}\)

Such oppositional rhetoric is present in many places in the New Testament. One immediately thinks of Jesus' controversy with "the Jews" in John 8:43-47, which reaches a point where Jesus asserts that the Jews are "sons of the devil." This is not the time and place to present a sociorhetorical analysis and interpretation of this oppositional discourse. Gail R. O'Day provides many excellent observations about it in her *New Interpreter's Bible* commentary on John. In particular, O'Day speaks directly to one of the major pleas made by Schüssler Fiorenza, namely,

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34. Schüssler Fiorenza, "Challenging the Rhetorical Half-Turn," 40; and idem, *Rhetoric and Ethic*, 92.
38. Schüssler Fiorenza, "Challenging the Rhetorical Half-Turn," 36; and idem, *Rhetoric and Ethic*, 89.
of enabling "biblical scholars to investigate the discursive arguments, which perform particular kinds of actions in particular historical situations and at particular political sites." I agree with this aim. The question, then, is the particular historical situation and political site that caused Schüssler Fiorenza to use oppositional rhetoric in her essay rather than a rhetoric that would invite discussion and debate among equals.

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to investigate the discursive arguments which perform particular kinds of actions in particular historical situations and at particular political sites.41 Many New Testament scholars join with O’Day in viewing the Johannine community as a minority group speaking out in protest against a majority culture.42 She expresses concern about the resultant oppositional rhetoric and explains the difficulty of reconciling it with other discourse in the New Testament.43 In other words, she does not herself unwittingly or unwittingly reenact the oppositional rhetoric in the text. The discourse attributed to Jesus introduces strong polarities to separate Jesus fully from “the Jews.” For various reasons, which she explains in her commentary, she does not wish to replay this kind of rhetoric in her commentary but calls attention to other modes of discourse in the New Testament that stand in relation to it. When O’Day makes this move, she takes major steps toward a rhetorical full-turn in interpretation.

**Sociorhetorical Interpretation as Translocational and Transdiscursive**

There is a beautiful moment in Schüssler Fiorenza’s Pretoria essay when she introduces the metaphor of the African American circle dance or the European folk dance to destabilize a binary frame of reference for figuring the practices of a critical feminist biblical interpretation. Within this description, I suggest, lies an image very close to the one that has guided my development of sociorhetorical interpretation. Schüssler Fiorenza proposes

41. Schüssler Fiorenza, “Challenging the Rhetorical Half-Turn,” 36; and idem, Rhetoric and Ethic, 89.
42. Gail R. O’Day, “John,” NIB 9:648: “The virulent language of chap. 8 must be read against this backdrop of being cast out of the synagogue, of being excluded from the religious centers that once helped to define one’s religious and communal identity. The language of this chapter is the language of the minority group spoken in protest to the majority culture. The Johannine Jewish Christians had no way to back up this language—that is, they had no power to take any actions comparable to their own exclusion from the synagogue. They were outnumbered by the Jewish community and had no political resources at their disposal. Their only ‘power’ rested in the force of their rhetoric, in their ability to denounce those who had excluded them.”
43. Ibid., 9:647: “John 8 presents the reader of the Gospel of John with some of the Gospel’s most difficult interpretive issues. The Jesus who emerges from these verses speaks with staggeringly sharp invective to his opponents and holds nothing back in his attack on his theological adversaries. It is very difficult to harmonize this picture of Jesus with the images of him that shape our theological imaginations: Jesus as the one who eats with outcasts and sinners, who cares for the lost sheep, who is the model of how we are to love.”

This image of movement and spiraling repetition introduces a very different mode of procedure than one that places oppositional rhetoric at the forefront, and I applaud it. It is an image that evokes well the goal of sociorhetorical analysis and interpretation.

In socio-rhetorical terms, the movement and spiraling to which Schüssler Fiorenza refers takes the form of translocational, transtextual, and transdiscursive interpretation. The translocational covers a spectrum of social locations from the intersubjective body to the household, village, city, kingdom, and empire. The transtextual weaves through inner texture, intertexture, social and cultural texture, ideological texture, and sacred texture.45 The transdiscursive enacts stepping in place, turning, and changing of venue from wisdom discourse to miracle discourse to prophetic discourse to recreation discourse to priestly discourse to apocalyptic discourse.46

Yet, despite these common concerns and goals, the oppositional nature of Schüssler Fiorenza’s rhetoric becomes a point of division. Indeed, such rhetoric runs the risk of attempting to corral its audience into one location and targeting the audience with one major kind of discourse. Emphasizing only one location, the *ekklesia* as the public, political assembly, and championing only one major mode of discourse, Divine Wisdom, she inadvertently rewrites only one major location and one major discourse in early Christian literature. New Testament literature itself shows us a better way. It is not all Divine Wisdom discourse, and it is not all located in the *ekklesia* as public, political assembly. Patterns of negotiation in multiple discourses and locations

44. Schüssler Fiorenza, “Challenging the Rhetorical Half-Turn,” 51; and idem, Rhetoric and Ethic, 101.
45. And, if possible, psychological texture should be included as well.
in the literature interweave diversity, conflict, separation, and conciliation into a thick configuration of history, society, culture, and ideology.

Venn’s description, using the work of Emmanuel Levinas, describes well a person’s ethical embodiment among others in the enactment of sociorhetorical analysis and interpretation: “Generosity and (vigilant) passivity, readiness to receive what exceeds the I, the welcoming of the Other, a kind of dispossessing of the ego: these are the modalities of the face relation. It is in that sense that the relation with the Other is an ethical relation.” 47 A patience of reception combined with a “readiness to receive what exceeds the I” guides sociorhetorical analysis and interpretation. The interpreter seeks to engage in heterogeneous responsibility rather than autonomous freedom, in intersubjective exploration rather than egological imposition. Both the text and the interpreter negotiate the other with particular goals, that is, modes of desire. Becoming conscious of these desires requires continual crossing and redrawing of boundaries, movement across textures of texts, 49 and movement through multiple argumentative modes of discourse. 50

My hypothesis is that transtextual sociorhetorical analysis and interpretation 51 yields six major rhetoroeects 52 that interweave in early Christian discourse: wisdom, miracle, prophetic, precreation, priestly, and apocalyptic. Each rhetoroeect embodies conventional religious goals in the first-century Mediterranean world. In Venn’s terminology, this means that each rhetoroeect enacts social, cultural, and ideological desires. The wisdom rhetoroeect uses household imagery to bring divine knowledge into intersubjective bodies, namely, all the secrets that lie within an ordered universe, to enable people to prosper and flourish in the world we inherit, inhabit, and transform. The miracle rhetoroeect uses imagery of intersubjective bodies to bring God’s powers at work in the created universe into an intersubjective body that, for one reason or another, is not fully operational, positively functional, or constructively interactive. The prophetic rhetoroeect uses imagery of a kingdom to transmit the will of God to people and groups who will challenge others—kings, priests, elders, interpreters, lawyers—to bring justice, love, care, and nurture to all people. The precreation rhetoroeect uses images of the household of an emperor to bring eternal forces of life into intersubjective bodies for a complete realization of well-being. The priestly rhetoroeect uses imagery of the temple to create beneficial exchange between humans and God. The apocalyptic rhetoroeect uses imagery of an empire both to enact total annihilation of powers (including earthly leaders and institutions) that disrupt and destroy the comforts of well-being (e.g., food, water, shelter, and supportive community) and to create new beginnings in divine time.

The presence of these major rhetoroeects in early Christian discourse means that the interpreter must recognize key modes of desire in early Christian discourse, in traditions of interpretation of this discourse, and in current interpreters of this discourse. Some early Christian texts negotiate these desires with loud, totalizing discourse. Others set totalizing discourses in dynamic dialogue with one another. Still others gather local voices in ways that create lively communities of alternative points of view. Interpreters must negotiate the desires of the text, rather than simply allow the desires to seduce them. Some interpreters, following a hermeneutics of suspicion, try to “negate” the desires of the text. Sociorhetorical interpretation exhibits desires of the text and refigures contemporary narrations of these desires. In this way, interpreters choreograph activities of a heteronomous subject interpreting the heteronomous desires of texts.

Following Venn’s terminology further, “every self is a storied self. And every story is mingled with the stories of other selves, so that every one of us is entangled in the stories we tell, and are told about us.” 54 Each storied world splices phenomenal time, or temporality as lived, into the cosmological time of history and of the sublime, that is, into the “time of the soul.” 55 Each storied world enacts an apprenticeship in the lifeworld. This apprenticeship “concerns learning a particular language game and an (alchemical) practice, that is, it involves at the same time a discursive and a material, transformative and transmutative practice.” 56 This means that each early Christian rhetoroeect is a storied world that intertwines temporality as lived and the cosmological time of history and the sublime in particular ways.

To put it in other terms that Venn uses, the six early Christian rhetoroeects invite in particular ways “both the inhospitable world into

47. Venn, Occidentalism, 211.
51. By this I mean programmatic sociorhetorical analysis and interpretation of inner, inter, social and cultural, ideological, and sacred textures (Robbins, Tapestry of Early Christian Discourse; and idem, Exploring the Texture of Texts).
52. I define the term thus: “A rhetoroeect is a form of language variety or discourse identifiable on the basis of a distinctive configuration of themes, topics, reasonings, and arguments” (Robbins, “Dialectical Nature,” 356).
54. Venn, Occidentalism, 42.
55. Ibid., 223; and Paul Ricoeur, Oneself as Another (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992).
56. Venn, Occidentalism, 220.