"Actions speak louder than words," he said.
"I don't believe it," she said.
"You shouldn't," he said. "I only said it."
"But," she said, "when you said it you did it."
—Anonymous

Parables and sayings about the Kingdom, and sayings about the Son of man, have been first order sources for reconstructing the teaching of Jesus since the beginning of this century. Appropriately, interpreters have approached these traditions with a presupposition that Jesus used particular forms of speech constituted by a particular configuration of thought patterns. However, most interpreters analyzed parables and sayings of Jesus without giving enough attention to the intricate relations among settings, actions, and speech in particular fields of discourse. A particular field of discourse results from the act of going to particular places or of already being there as part of a person's situation in life. The speaker's meaning is related to the posture of the speaker's speech and action in the situations and the way people hear and understand the speaker's presence, action, and speech in those situations.

The best hope for attaining a comprehensive understanding of Jesus' discourse lies in methods which preserve and appreciate the fields of discourse which early Christians used to transmit the settings, action, and speech of Jesus. Unfortunately, traditional methods have exercised great violence on the fields of discourse which bring Jesus' parables and sayings to us. Source, form, and redaction criticism cut the sayings and parables out of their contexts, "reconstruct" them, and place them in "reconstructed" contexts to see what they really meant. The acts of removing the parable or saying, eliminating the accumulations from it, and then asking it to exhibit its "true" function are violent acts on the fields of discourse in which it attained or maintained meaning and to
which it gave meaning. During an era of ‘historical’ analysis guided by a paradigm designed to destroy that which was false and establish that which uniquely occurred, these procedures were considered to be essential safeguards against ‘being taken in’ by someone’s later view of an earlier situation. But what was once considered to be a historical gain, because it took us to an earlier “source,” is now appearing as a “social historical” loss, because it not only removes the data from the systems in which and through which it gave meaning and received meaning, but it also reconstructs the data in the parable or saying itself.

The test for sayings of Jesus lies in their relation to situations and actions. Situations and actions provide the primary field of data for the system in which the sayings and stories have meaning. The stories and sayings associated with Jesus of Nazareth exist in fields of discourse created by early Christians. These stories and sayings are our only means for identifying the action and discourse associated with Jesus at the earliest stages of the tradition. The energetic research on the Jesus tradition in the past has yielded informative results. The time has come, however, to reform methods which were designed to establish the history of textual variations, manuscript dependence, and the editing of traditions so they exhibit the tacit premises and presuppositions of actors in social situations where identities were formed through action and discourse. Sayings and stories in the Jesus tradition functioned in fields of discourse created by individuals and groups engaged in the formation of social relationships and identity. The discussion in the present paper uses procedures related to classical rhetoric, the progymnastic rhetoric of Theon and Hermogenes,¹ modern applications of classical rhetoric, and modern linguistics to uncover early fields of discourse in the Jesus tradition. This analysis is applied to the beatitudes and to the sayings about turning the other cheek, giving the cloak, and going the extra mile.

M. Eugene Boring’s paper, “Criteria of Authenticity: The Beatitudes as a Test Case,” J. Dominic Crossan’s paper, “Divine Immediacy and Human Immediacy: Towards a New First Principle in Historical Jesus Research,” and Robert W. Funk’s paper, “Polling the Pundits” give an excellent picture of where we stand as we search for a systematic under-

¹ [Editor: Aelius Theon wrote his Progymnasmata (his propaedeutic or introductory exercises to rhetoric) around the end of the first century CE. The work is a handbook containing a graduated series of rhetorical exercises designed to instruct students in writing and speaking properly and persuasively. James Butts is preparing a critical edition of the Greek text with a translation into English (forthcoming, Polebridge Press). Hermogenes produced his Progymnasmata in the second century BCE. It became influential in the schools from the fifth century onwards.]
standing of the beginnings and development of Jesus traditions. Most of all, we see new criteria on the horizon in the form of "plausible Traditionsgeschichte" and "hermeneutical potential" in Boring's paper, and "hermeneutical adequacy" in Crossan's paper. The discussion of these criteria opens the door to issues I introduced in "Picking Up the Fragments." It seems to me that the primary issue is the relation of items to one another within sayings and the relation of sayings to one another, to situations, and to actions.

In this paper I will display the beginnings of a system of analysis which is guided by a criterion I call the criterion of pragmatic relations. The criterion brings aspects of the criteria of plausible Traditionsgeschichte, coherence, hermeneutical potential and hermeneutical adequacy together in one criterion. The purpose is to formulate a systematic approach for analyzing the relations of implications and explications in single or grouped sayings, whether they be in clusters, strings, dialogues or pronunciation stories. This approach reverses the analytical procedure of the prevailing historical approach, which insists on establishing a history of the tradition before it establishes the relation of sayings to one another. The criterion of pragmatic relations places synchronic analysis prior to diachronic analysis. In this manner, the analysis uses the extant fields of discourse in the texts as an aid for understanding the development of fields of discourse in the tradition. The extant fields of discourse are not seen as secondary systems which must be destroyed because they are hostile to the primary system which originated with Jesus. Rather, they are viewed as sectors of the network of communication which functioned in, around, and through the situations, actions, and speech of Jesus and his followers. The presupposition is that later sectors of the network emerged through some kind of bridging with or from earlier sectors of the network. Through systematic analysis of the pragmatic relations among sayings, actions, and situa-

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2 I am grateful to Walther Ch. Zimmerli, visiting professor at Emory University during Fall 1985, for helpful discussion and critique of this paper and its subject matter.
3 "Development of the tradition."
4 [Editor: "Hermeneutical potential" refers to the possibilities of interpretation latent in a text.]
5 [Editor: "Hermeneutical adequacy" is a phrase of J. D. Crossan's in his article, "Divine Immediacy and Human Immediacy." It refers to the criterion for determining authenticity defined as that original which best explains the multiplicity engendered by a given text.]
6 [Editor: Synchronic analysis is addressed to a constellation of words and meanings present at a given moment of time; diachronic analysis traces the history of such moments.]
tions in the extant fields of discourse in texts available to us, there is a potential for describing the kinds of bridging which occurred among the earlier fields of discourse, which includes the field of discourse which functioned in and through the situations, actions, and sayings of Jesus himself.

A key for understanding a pragmatic approach to texts will be that we shall not “eliminate” texts or parts of texts as we talk about them. Instead, we will ask texts to do certain things and watch to see if they can do them, and how they do them if they purport to do them. This approach replaces the structural relations of semantics with the functional relations of pragmatics. Thus, if we see a text that looks like a syllogism, we will ask it to perform like a syllogism. If a text performs like a syllogism, it reveals pragmatically presupposed premises which remain hidden in ordinary discourse. These premises exhibit the presence either of conventional knowledge or of meaning-links in a field of discourse which itself is linked only in certain ways with conventional knowledge. If a text which looks like a syllogism performs in a peculiar manner, we will seek to understand the nature of its peculiarity. The particular manner in which the syllogism performs will tell us about its relation to things not only within itself but to other things outside it.

1. The Relation between Stated and Unstated Premises

The pragmatic dimension of a saying concerns its meaning in context. A saying has meaning as it functions in a system of relations. When we come to a saying of Jesus, or a saying of Jesus comes to us, written or spoken, we engage in some way with its meaning and its meaning engages in some way with us. If there is no engagement, there is no relation and no meaning either for it or for us. This engagement gives the saying meaning and gives us meaning from the saying. The saying has meaning through the relation of items to one another in the saying and the relation of those related items to other things, often present in sayings, actions, or other expressed or unexpressed phenomena in the world. In other words, a saying has its meaning in and through its relationships.

Dominic Crossan has given us a fresh start on the analysis of sayings in his book In Fragments. There does seem, however, to be too much emphasis in his analysis on the isolation of sayings from one another and from situations and actions. This means that he has emphasized

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7 [Editor: A syllogism is a mode of formal argument consisting of a major premise, a minor premise, and a conclusion. Example: All men are mortal. Socrates is a man. Therefore, Socrates is mortal.]
semantics rather than pragmatics. The sayings, situations, and actions are part of a network of meanings in a social, cultural, and religious environment in which people lived. It would be good if we could find a way systematically and comprehensively to analyze the relation of precepts, presuppositions, assertions, settings and actions in the transmitted tradition. The possibility for doing this lies in the arena of pragmatic analysis. The pragmatics of discourse concerns "the systematic relations between structures of text and context." My beginning attempts, and even my later attempts, to analyze our texts for their pragmatic relations will be imperfect, and in any case they will reflect my belief that textual linguistics needs to learn from rhetorical theory. But if other people are willing to join in the endeavor, I think the relatedness of traditions to one another can be explored in a manner which has not been tried before. This analysis can never describe the total relation of things to one another, because it is not possible either to contain or exhaust the relations of a saying, even in pragmatic analysis. Analysis of the meaning always produces meaning alongside the saying. But the only way a saying has meaning is to have meaning both within it and alongside it simultaneously. If either dimension is absent, there is no meaning. Therefore, analysis is about meaning outside and around a saying as well as in it, because the saying means through its relationships.

The first step is to stand alongside the saying and work with the meaning in the saying itself. Boring's choice of the beatitudes is a fascinating place to begin. Each beatitude means what it means by introducing a proposition. Moreover, as it introduces the proposition, it presents a reason, a rationale for the proposition. If we begin with the reconstructed Q version presented by Boring, we see the following:

B1  Blessed are the poor,
    because theirs is the kingdom of God.

B2  Blessed are those who hunger,
    because they shall be satisfied.

B3  Blessed are those who weep,
    because they shall be comforted.

B4  Blessed are you when they hate you
    and when they exclude you
    and when they insult you for the sake of the Son of man;
    Rejoice and be glad
    because your reward is great in heaven;
    because thus they regularly did to the prophets.

8  Teun van Dijk, Text and Context, 205.
The propositional nature of these sayings is pertinent, since Matthew presents a version of these beatitudes at the beginning of the Sermon on the Mount and Luke presents a version at the beginning of the Sermon on the Plain; the beginning of a speech is the place to introduce basic propositions which will be developed in the speech. These propositions, then, take us to assertions both Matthew and Luke considered to be primary for understanding the tradition about Jesus. They also bear the potential for opening the door to primary propositions and presuppositions within Jesus’ own teaching and action. We may discover, on the other hand, that these propositions are primary to early Christians but are derived from stated and unstated premises and propositions in the speech and action of Jesus. The criterion of pragmatic relations is designed to help us decide whose premises and propositions they were.

Each proposition in each beatitude has a rationale or reason, thus each proposition is grounded in the relation of this proposition to something which supports it, which provides “scaffolding” for it. Rhetoricians, and in the first place Aristotle, recognized that a proposition with a rationale is a rhetorical syllogism, which they called an enthymeme. An enthymeme is the form of syllogism we present in common discourse. Thus, in common discourse we do not say:

First premise: Because all men are mortal,
Second premise: and because Socrates is a man,
Conclusion: therefore Socrates is mortal.

Rather, we say either “Socrates is mortal, because all men are mortal,” or “Socrates is mortal, because he is a man.” We omit one or the other of the premises (the reasons), because we know, or hope, that the other person presupposes it along with us. This means that one of the premises remains unstated, which we often call implicit, and this premise is filled in intuitively by the person to whom we speak. When we speak to people we call “uninformed,” they do not fill in the premises or they substitute “erroneous” premises for ours.

If each beatitude is a rhetorical syllogism, an enthymeme, each beatitude has an unstated premise. If we display the reconstructed Q beatitudes as syllogisms, the unstated premises appear as follows, and we may begin to hear or see something in the saying we did not hear or see before:

B1 Unstated premise: *Blessed are those to whom the kingdom of God belongs.*
Stated premise: The kingdom of God belongs to the poor.

10 See Aristotle, *The "Art" of Rhetoric*, 1.2.1356b[8].
Conclusion: Therefore, blessed are the poor.
B2 Unstated premise: Blessed are those who shall be satisfied.
Stated premise: The hungry shall be satisfied.
Conclusion: Therefore, blessed are the hungry.
B3 Unstated premise: Blessed are those who shall be comforted.
Stated premise: Those who weep shall be comforted.
Conclusion: Therefore, blessed are those who weep.
B4 Unstated premise: Blessed are those who are hated, excluded and insulted.
Stated premise: The prophets were hated, excluded and insulted.
Conclusion /Premise: Therefore, blessed are the prophets.
Unstated premise: You are like the prophets when they hate, exclude and insult you for the sake of the Son of man.
Conclusion: Therefore, blessed are you when they hate, exclude and insult you for the sake of the Son of man.
Unstated premise: The reward of those who are hated, excluded, and insulted is great in heaven.
Stated premise: You are hated, excluded, and insulted.
Conclusion: Therefore, your reward is great in heaven.
Unstated premise: One whose reward is great in heaven can rejoice and be glad.
Stated premise (above): Your reward is great in heaven.
Conclusion: Therefore, rejoice and be glad.

Let us begin with the first unstated premise. Initially at least, there seems to be nothing unusual in the unstated premise in B1: “Blessed are those to whom the kingdom of God belongs.” The phrase “kingdom of God” is a traditional cognitive-emotive construct that refers to God as king, and “being blessed through possession” is a way of talking about the vital and affirmative nature of one’s life if one enjoys something God has designed as special. The full meaning of this premise may be exhibited if all of it is made explicit in the following form: “Blessed [by God] are those to whom the kingdom of God belongs.” “God” is present on both sides of the equation making the premise virtually tautological:11 “Blessed by God are those to whom [the blessing of] God’s kingly action belongs.” The similarity of this proposition to Deut 33:29 is striking: “Blessed are you, Israel; who is like you, a people saved by the Lord, the shield of your help and the sword of your triumph?” The “scaffolding” which supports the first Q beatitude is related semantically to the

11 [Editor: “Tautological” means redundant or repetitious.]
presupposition that some group presently possesses something special from God. In the terminology of the verse in Deuteronomy, the underlying presupposition is: "Blessed are the people who are saved by the Lord, the shield of help and the sword of triumph." The Q version shares the imagery of God's power, but it refers to God's "kingdom" or "kingly activity" without reference to "shield" and "sword." The adoption of the concept of God's sovereign power without reference to the instruments of that power may be the tip of an iceberg. It may be a way of thinking about God's power which is always "tensive" in nature, always pushing or pulling our perceptions, presuppositions, determinations, and emotions. We will, however, have to test this.

The logical function of the stated premise in the first Q beatitude, "the kingdom of God belongs to the poor," is like the middle premise in the syllogism "Socrates is a man": it assigns the universal statement in the general premise to a particular instance, in this instance a particular group rather than one individual person. But the selection is tensive, in contrast to the selection of Socrates, since it associates people who live in a state of poverty, people who do not appear to be receiving the blessing of God, with the traditional construct, kingdom of God. To be sure, the heritage of being blessed by God's kingship lies in Jewish covenant tradition, the roots of a special understanding of the relationship of the poor to God lie in the Hebrew Bible and a continuation of these traditions is present in the Qumran literature and other contemporary Jewish literature. But the relation of the poor to the kingdom of God is tensive, because the statement appears to refer to the present, and the poor do not appear to be receiving God's blessing in the present. As Bernard Scott has observed: "the poor might receive the kingdom in the future, but that theirs is the kingdom assaults common wisdom." The stated premise, then, asserts uncommon wisdom, while the unstated premise presents conventional Jewish wisdom in gnomic form.

Can we understand the nature of the tension in the stated premise in a more complete manner? The tension results from associating the kingdom of God with people whose state of affairs does not appear to reflect the blessing of God. In other words, the stated premise exhibits the speaker's alignment, at least cognitively and emotively, with people whose state of affairs does not appear to exhibit the "rich" blessings of God, whatever those are supposed to be. We cannot say from within the

12 See Tannehill, The Sword of His Mouth, for analysis of different kinds of "tension" in sayings.
13 Scott, "Picking Up the Pieces," 17.
14 [Editor: To be gnomic in form means to be expressed as an aphorism or maxim, i.e., in a short, terse, illuminating sentence.]
statement itself that the speaker is an actual member of this group, but we can see a social posturing of the speaker toward those whose condition in life is poor, whatever "poor" means. To understand the nature of the "poor," we need to learn from the use of the term both in Jewish tradition and the meaning of being "poor" according to social analysts of antiquity. Hollenbach\textsuperscript{15} proposes that the "poor" represent the people who are not the "rulers" in antiquity. In other words, there was no middle class as we experience it, since there was no organized economy which allowed a large sector of population to experience the benefits of production. Rather, the ruling class was known for its conspicuous consumption, and the rest of the people lived in a subservient position to the ruling class, with surplus being drained off by those who ruled. Since Jesus is characterized in the tradition as a person associated with a Jewish family in Nazareth headed by a father who was a carpenter, and Jesus himself adopted an itinerant ministry in village-towns, virtually everything points to his own membership among the "poor," as social historians would define the poor in antiquity. It would not be surprising, then, if the tensiveness in the stated premise reflects a social posturing within the thought and action of Jesus himself. The relation of stated and unstated premises to an actual state of affairs in Syro-Palestine and uniformly associated with Jesus in the tradition suggests a direct pragmatic relation between this beatitude and the characterization of Jesus' social bearing and activity in the tradition.\textsuperscript{16}

It is informative to look next at the unstated premises in B2 and B3. The unstated premises in the second and third beatitudes contain future rather than present tense:

\begin{itemize}
\item B2  Blessed are those who shall be satisfied.
\item B3  Blessed are those who shall be comforted.
\end{itemize}

In this form, there is little problem accepting the ideas: people who \textit{shall be} satisfied and \textit{shall be} comforted are blessed people. These statements are similar to the assertions which follow in Deut 33:29: "Your enemies \textit{shall} come fawning to you; and you \textit{shall} tread upon their high places." When referring to certain situations in life, the future tense seems perfectly acceptable: people who \textit{shall be} saved from destruction by enemies and \textit{shall be} given a position of power over their enemies surely are blessed people \textit{now}. When, however, a threat of external aggression is replaced by a threat of internal oppression or annihilation, the

\textsuperscript{15} Hollenbach, "Defining Poor and Rich," 19.
implications of the future tense change. Instead of external military threat, the second and third beatitudes refer to internal biological and emotional threat: "being hungry" and "weeping" or "mourning." It is less obvious that those “who hunger now” but "shall be satisfied" and those "who weep or mourn now" but "shall be satisfied" are blessed people now. Let us look more closely at how this works.

The terms in the stated premise of the second beatitude refer to a biological state of affairs, being hungry, and this state of affairs relates directly to a state of affairs where one is unable to get food. In the context we are analyzing, it appears that the people are hungry, because they are in a state described as poor. In other words, the biological state of hunger results from the state of poverty referred to in the first beatitude. This means that the term that caused the tension in the stated premise of B1, poor, stands in a related position to the term hungry in the stated premise of B2. Moreover, the premises stand in a relation of premise to conclusion: “the hungry shall be satisfied, because the poor belong to the kingdom of God.”

As in B2, so in B3 both the stated and unstated premises are tensive. It is not obvious that “those who shall be comforted” are blessed now, and it is presumptuous to claim to know that “those who weep now shall be comforted.” In this instance, the term “weeping” in the stated premise refers to an emotional state of affairs which is related to the biological state of hunger which results from a state of poverty. In fact, the variation in the tradition between “weep” and “mourn” may result from the difference between the state of hunger while one is alive, which causes weeping, and the state of hunger which finally brings death, which causes mourning.

Beatitudes B1, B2, and B3, then, stand in a chained pragmatic relation, each dependent on the other. The inferential bridging appears natural, logical, and sequential: poverty produces hunger produces weeping or mourning. If the cognitive-emotive meaning of possessing the kingdom of God means that one is “blessed” (according to the unstated initial premise), then if the kingdom belongs to the poor, it follows that the hungry shall be satisfied and those who weep or mourn shall be comforted. Special tension arises in the reasoning, because the situation of poverty, hunger, and weeping or mourning appears to be an internal threat to existence which continually exhibits a lack of “being blessed now” as they bring hardship and death. An external threat of aggression, on the other hand, regularly focuses on a future, climactic event of victory or defeat.

When we move to the unstated premise of B4, we see a shift from the chain of argumentation which extended from B1 through B3. The unstated premise in B4, "Blessed are those who are hated, excluded and
insulted,” shares the gnomic, proverbial quality of the unstated premise in B1 rather than the future dimensions of the unstated premises in B2 and B3. Its gnomic quality reveals its nature as a general premise which seeks a place alongside the initial general premise: “Blessed are those to whom the kingdom of God belongs” (B1). In other words, the premise in B4 seeks to be a “first principle” alongside the “first principle” which provides the scaffolding for B1, B2, and B3. When we seek the tradition which grounds the reasoning in B4, we are not led to tradition about the action of God but about the action of certain men—the prophets and the Son of man. B4 relates a statement about men’s action to the statement about God’s action in B1, B2, and B3.

In other words, here a different line of reasoning emerges, and it contains its own particular dynamics. “Blessed are those to whom the kingdom of God belongs” (B1) describes people who benefit from a process of selection undetermined by them. For some reason, people in the ascribed state of poverty (a state simply imposed on them by life itself) possess the kingdom of God. In contrast, people in a state of being hated, excluded and insulted are in a state they have taken upon themselves (an achieved state “for the sake of the Son of man”). An achieved state does not arise intrinsically from an identity imposed by the situation in which a person was born and raised, or which resulted from circumstances of climate or economic oppression, but it arises out of a process of socialization by which a person has acquired a particular social identity and posture. It is the result of an identity based on a process of initiation into a way of life modeled on the prophets and related to the Son of man. The “scaffolding” for this reasoning is not found directly in “God’s kingly action” or “God’s kingdom,” but in a “blessing” which is perceived to rest on the prophets in Israel’s past history. If the reasoning about being hated, excluded and insulted were directly related to the reasoning in the first three beatitudes, a premise would lie near to hand that “those who are selected by God to be hated, excluded and insulted are blessed.” In B4, however, “for the sake of the Son of man” stands in the place of “because they are selected by God.” This means that B4 reflects a developed chain of reasoning grounded in God’s selection of the Son of man as one to be hated, excluded and insulted and supported by analogy with the prophets.

The underlying reasoning is not near to hand, however. Rather, the stated reasoning concerns action by men against the prophets, the Son of man, and those who adopt a role “for the sake of the Son of man.” In contrast to the reasoning underlying B1 through B3, the abuse comes

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from people who, at least originally, were selected by God to be participants in his covenant of blessing. Therefore, the reader encounters a break in reasoning between the first three beatitudes and the fourth beatitude. The inferential bridge from the blessing which the poor receive from the kingdom and the blessing which the prophets receive is not immediately obvious. There is also a substantial change in the nature of the syllogism. The stated premise describes action which was performed by people against the prophets. Then a conclusion is drawn through the logic of analogy: “You are like the prophets when they hate, exclude, and insult you for the sake of the Son of man.” In the last beatitude, then, the topic has shifted, and the reasoning has shifted to analogical logic. Beyond this, we must notice that the reasoning in B4 might be perceived to conflict with the reasoning in B1, B2, and B3.

If our analysis is correct, B1, B2, and B3 are grounded in the tradition of God’s sovereign power which selects a particular group as beneficiaries of his kingly activity. Lying behind the tradition is a presupposition that God will give this group power and status over its enemies. B4, however, is grounded in a tradition where agents of God are excluded, hated, and insulted. The irony in the tradition appears to be that these agents are not excluded, hated, and insulted by “the enemies” but by members of the group which has been specially selected by God. We will return to this beatitude below to explore the significance of the change in logic and the grounding in tradition.

In summary, the first three beatitudes we have analyzed are an integrated pragmatic unit, what I think Dominic Crossan means by a primary cluster. The cluster is an integrated pragmatic unit with a “posture”18 that aligns the speaker with people in a state of poverty, which produces a biological state of hunger and an emotional state of weeping or mourning. The fourth beatitude shifts the topic to those who adopt a social (prophetic) posture that brings abuse from others, rather than those who exist in an ascribed state (poverty) that produces its own abuse intrinsically. The initial cluster is grounded in tradition about God’s activity, while the final beatitude is grounded in tradition about God’s agents who are abused by members of the group God has specially selected to receive His blessings.

2. Qualitative or Accumulative rather than Logical Progression

The Matthean beatitudes explore achieved spiritual states related to the last beatitude in Q, rather than the ascribed state of poverty referred

to in the first three beatitudes in Q. In syllogistic form, they look like this:

M1 Unstated: *Blessed are those to whom the kingdom of heaven belongs.*
Stated: The kingdom of heaven belongs to the poor in spirit.
Conclusion: Therefore, blessed are the poor in spirit.

M2 Unstated: *Blessed are those who shall be comforted.*
Stated: Those who mourn shall be comforted.
Conclusion: Therefore, blessed are those who mourn.

M3 Unstated: *Blessed are those who shall inherit the earth.*
Stated: The meek shall inherit the earth.
Conclusion: Therefore, blessed are the meek.

M4 Unstated: *Blessed are those who shall be satisfied.*
Stated: Those who hunger and thirst for righteousness shall be satisfied.
Conclusion: Therefore, blessed are those who hunger and thirst for righteousness.

M5 Unstated: *Blessed are those who shall obtain mercy.*
Stated: The merciful shall obtain mercy.
Conclusion: Therefore, blessed are the merciful.

M6 Unstated: *Blessed are those who shall see God.*
Stated: The pure in heart shall see God.
Conclusion: Therefore, blessed are the pure in heart.

M7 Unstated: *Blessed are those who shall be called sons of God.*
Stated: The peacemakers shall be called sons of God.
Conclusion: Therefore, blessed are the peacemakers.

M8 Unstated: *Blessed are those to whom the kingdom of heaven belongs.*
Stated: The kingdom of heaven belongs to those who are persecuted for righteousness’ sake.
Conclusion: Therefore, blessed are those who are persecuted for righteousness’ sake.

M9 Unstated: *Blessed are those whom men revile and persecute, and against whom all manner of evil is uttered falsely.*
Stated: Men reviled, persecuted and uttered all manner of evil falsely against the prophets who were before you.
Conclusion /Premise: Therefore, blessed are the prophets who were before you.

Unstated: You are like the prophets who were before you when men revile, persecute and utter all manner of evil against you falsely for my sake.

Conclusion: Therefore, blessed are you when men revile, persecute and utter all manner of evil against you falsely for my sake.

Unstated: *The reward of the one who is blessed is great in heaven.*
Stated (above): Blessed are you when men revile you, persecute you, and utter all manner of evil against you falsely for my sake.
Conclusion: Therefore, your reward is great in heaven.
Unstated: One whose reward is great in heaven can rejoice and be glad.
Stated (above): Your reward is great in heaven.
Conclusion: Therefore, rejoice and be glad.

The unstated premises of M1, M4, and M2 are the same as the unstated premises in B1, B2, and B3. The stated premises and the conclusions in M1 and M4, however, are noticeably different, since the characterization of the particular groups is spiritual rather than economic and biological. The "spiritual" nature of the terms in Matthew introduces a significantly different field of discourse than is present in the reconstructed Q beatitudes. In the Q version as presented by Boring, the terms "poor" and "hungry" are primary signs which, using the terminology of Charles Sanders Pierce,19 are virtually equivalent to iconic signs. An iconic sign "produces the mental image of an object which joins with the 'word presentation' to form a signifying unit."20 In this context, "poor" produces the mental image of people in a state of poverty, and this image is reinforced through primary reference to people who are hungry and who weep as a result of their hunger. In contrast, "poor" and "hunger" in the Matthean version are "symbols."

A Symbol is a sign which refers to the Object that it denotes by virtue of a law, usually an association of general ideas which operates to cause the Symbol to be interpreted as referring to that Object.21

In Matthew, the terms become symbols by associating "poor" with "in spirit" and "hunger" with "for righteousness." The auditor wonders exactly what it might mean for a person to be "poor in spirit" or to "hunger for righteousness." Does the former mean that the person "lacks" spirit like poverty constitutes a lack of riches? Does the latter mean that a person "starves" himself or herself as a means of gaining control over the desires of the body, which is righteousness? If it means that a person should want righteousness like he or she wants food, does it mean that a person should want righteousness as a personal possession, or is righteousness something a person wants for others as well as himself or herself? In other words, how are the ideas "poor," "spirit," "hunger," and "righteousness" to be associated with one another? Moreover, what causes the "mourning" in the second Matthean beatitude? Do people mourn because they "lack spirit" or because righteousness is not

19 Pierce, Collected Papers, 4:359.
20 Silverman, The Subject of Semiotics, 21.
21 Collected Papers, 2:143.
"alive"? What, then, is the association of the ideas in these beatitudes where terms and phrases are being used as symbols?

The different use of the terms in Matthew produces a "qualitative" or "accumulative" sequence rather than a logical sequence. In other words, instead of the beatitudes following one another like premises to conclusions, one beatitude introduces a quality which prepares the auditor for another quality, which the auditor accepts as appropriate in relation to the preceding qualities. In the Matthean beatitudes, then, the progression moves from the "poor in spirit" to "those who mourn," "the meek," "those who hunger and thirst for righteousness," "the merciful," "the pure in heart," "the peacemakers," "those who are persecuted for righteousness' sake," and "you who are reviled, persecuted, and spoken against falsely with all manner of evil." This string of sayings finds its pragmatic relatedness in spiritual states of affair which provide the conditions for actions guided by "spiritual" attitudes, precepts, and presuppositions. The initial spiritual states create the conditions for "being merciful," "being peacemakers," and "being able to accept abuse from others" for the sake of "righteousness" and "Jesus." Because the words in the first four beatitudes are "symbols," the auditor develops a form of reflection which circles from the last four beatitudes back to the first four to determine what the first four might mean.

Interpreters guided by literary-historical methods have considered it natural to focus on the three beatitudes which share the features of "being poor," "being hungry," and "weeping or mourning." From the perspective of pragmatic relations, however, a major challenge is to find one or more beatitudes in Matthew which appear to lie at the heart of the "spiritual" field of discourse exhibited by the Matthean beatitudes. The eighth beatitude in Matthew, "Blessed are those who are persecuted for righteousness' sake, for theirs is the kingdom of heaven" (Matt 5:10) stands out, because of its parallel nature to the first Q beatitude. Beatitude M8 shares the same unstated gnomic premise as Q1, "Blessed are those to whom the kingdom of heaven belongs," with one variation—kingdom "of heaven" rather than kingdom "of God." This beatitude exhibits the center of the Matthean field of discourse as it relates "being persecuted for righteousness' sake" with "possession of the kingdom of heaven."

The crucial difference between beatitudes M8 and Q1 appears to lie in the unstated implication that "righteousness" is first of all an attribute of God. Thus, instead of "blessed are the poor, because God [blesses] them by his kingly action" (Q1), the implication is "blessed are those who are

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22 Burke, Counterstatement, 124-25; Robbins, Jesus the Teacher, 9-12, 75-87, 201-209; Sørensen, "Coherence as a Pragmatic Concept," 659.
persecuted for the sake of God's righteous kingly action." The emphasis in the Matthean field of discourse is not the shared possession of the "kingly action" but the shared possession of the "attribute" of righteousness. The rest of the beatitudes, except M9 which operates out of the logic of analogy with the prophets, emphasizes an "attribute of character" related to God's righteousness: "being poor in spirit," "mourning," "being meek," "hungering and thirsting for righteousness," "being merciful," "purity in heart," and "being peacemakers." The most striking beatitude among them is "blessed are the merciful, because they shall be mercied." In this beatitude the person on earth possesses the attribute of "mercy" which God is shown to possess when he "shows mercy." In Matthew, the base for the field of discourse appears to be "the attributes" of God's kingly action rather than "God's kingly action" in and of itself. And here the question arises if this field of discourse emerges in a position of "bridging" or in a position of parallel linking. In order to find a solution to this issue, we must analyze the pragmatic relation of other data in the Jesus tradition to the fields of discourse we have uncovered in our analysis of the beatitudes.

Before turning to other data in the tradition, we must turn to the Lukan beatitudes, since we actually began with "reconstructed" beatitudes. And now we face one of the most serious problems in New Testament research. The form of the beatitudes with which we began is considered widely to approximate the earliest form available to interpreters. In fact, however, these reconstructed beatitudes impose a form of discourse on the tradition which is unlike any performance of the beatitudes available in extant manuscripts. The form we presented at the beginning is a reconstruction based on a presupposition that Jesus would have spoken beatitudes in the conventional Jewish form which contained third person rather than second person.23 This matter, as it turns out, is highly significant, since there is no difficulty transforming the "reconstructed" beatitudes and the Matthean beatitudes into syllogisms, but there is great difficulty transforming the Lukan beatitudes into acceptable syllogisms. In other words, wittingly or unwittingly, interpreters have transported to the Lukan beatitudes that feature in the Matthean beatitudes which gives them a clear "logical" structure, and they have called the result "the earliest form" of the beatitudes, most likely authentic with Jesus. Interpreters have created a performance of the beatitudes which exists nowhere in texts available to us in the tradition. My analysis of other materials suggests that this kind of situation has occurred elsewhere in New Testament analysis since

Bultmann's *History of the Synoptic Tradition*. Interpreters reconstruct an "early" form which is "logically" more clear than any actual performance we encounter in the tradition. The right to do this regularly is achieved by asserting that sayings circulated "independently." Since they circulated independently, the interpreter has the right to reformulate them as "propositions" or "premises" which "make sense" in settings envisioned by the interpreter. Thus we get reconstructions which impose fields of discourse on the tradition which the tradition does not itself exhibit. The "clearer" form is constructed through violence to the pragmatic fields of discourse which "actually" exist in the texts available to us.

The Lukan beatitudes have the following form:

L1  Blessed are the poor,
    because yours is the kingdom of God.
L2  Blessed are those who hunger now,
    because you shall be satisfied.
L3  Blessed are those who weep now,
    because you shall laugh.
L4  Blessed are you when men hate you,
    and when they exclude you and revile you,
    and cast out your name as evil, for the sake of the Son of man!
    rejoice in that day, and leap for joy,
    because behold, your reward is great in heaven;
    because thus their fathers regularly did to the prophets.

The first three beatitudes contain the logical progression from a state of poverty to a biological state of hunger to an emotional state of weeping, which we discussed above. In Luke, however, the first clause contains an impersonal construction, but the second clause applies the beatitude with a second person possessive adjective or verb ending. This form produces a most interesting syllogism, since the "general" premise is characterized by "specific" application. In syllogistic form, the Lukan beatitudes appear as follows:

L1  Stated:  Yours is the kingdom of God.
       Unstated:  *You are poor.*
       Conclusion:  Therefore, blessed are the poor.
L2  Stated:  You shall be satisfied.
       Unstated:  *You hunger now.*
       Conclusion:  Therefore, blessed are those who hunger now.
L3  Stated:  You shall laugh.
       Unstated:  *You weep now.*
       Conclusion:  Therefore, blessed are those who weep now.
L4  Unstated:  *Blessed are those whose fathers hate, exclude, insult and cast out their name as evil.*
Stated: The fathers of the prophets regularly hated, excluded, insulted and cast out their name as evil.

Conclusion
/Premise: Therefore, blessed are the prophets whose fathers hated, excluded, insulted and cast out their name as evil.

Unstated: You are like the prophets when men hate you, and when they exclude you, insult you and cast out your name as evil for the sake of the Son of man.

Conclusion: Therefore, blessed are you when men hate you, and when they exclude you, insult you and cast out your name as evil for the sake of the Son of man.

Unstated: The reward of the one who is blessed is great in heaven.

Stated (above): Blessed are you when men hate, exclude, insult, and cast out your name as evil for the sake of the Son of man.

Conclusion: Your reward is great in heaven.

Unstated: One whose reward is great in heaven can rejoice in that day and leap for joy.

Stated (above): Your reward is great in heaven.

Conclusion: Rejoice in that day and leap for joy.

The interpretive challenge with the first three syllogisms resides in the stated premise. The first premise should be general, followed by an application of the first premise to a particular instance. Instead, the first premise not only applies a general premise to a particular instance, but personalizes the particular instance through direct address to second plural auditors. For this reason, instead of “blessed are those who belong to the kingdom of God,” which we have in the Matthean third person, we have “yours is the kingdom of God” in the Lukan form. This is an interesting matter, since I observed in “Picking Up the Fragments” that sayings attributed to Jesus regularly contain features that reflect a personal vision related to specific situations, and this distinguishes them from proverbs.

And now we need to return to analysis of the beatitudes in present scholarship. Bernard Scott, who has worked through recent scholarship on the teaching of Jesus and made a significant contribution with his book Jesus, Symbol-Maker for the Kingdom, argues for the third person form of the beatitudes as the earliest on the basis of Dupont’s evidence, even though he insists that Jesus used “kingdom” as a tensive symbol which “cannot be reduced to discursive speech or propositions.” 24 The irony is that the “reconstructed” forms with which he and other interpreters begin, after “eliminating secondary elements,” are forms that have been taken out of the fields of discourse that transmitted them and

24 Scott, Jesus, Symbol-Maker, 12.
have been reconstructed into forms that are more propositional and
discursive in nature. In other words, interpreters destroy the fields of
discourse in which our stories and sayings had meaning, cut off items
which reveal the semantic plurisignificance of the terms, phrases, and
structures, and impose, wittingly or unwittingly, new fields of discourse
"by violence," i.e., by cutting and rewording the performances in the
tradition.

We must, in my opinion, find another way, and my suggestion is to
work with a criterion of "pragmatic relations" that asks sayings and
stories to "show" the fields of discourse in which they communicated in
the past, rather than "creating" fields of discourse unlike any which exist
in extant documents. In the particular situation we are discussing,
literary-historical analysis performs violence on texts at points where
the text is too vulnerable. We have the best chance of uncovering
distinctive dimensions in the earliest fields of discourse by becoming
"informed" about the fields of discourse through which the traditions
were transmitted, not by "cutting" what we perceive to be earliest units
out of the discursive contexts which have brought them to us. We would
be better off to talk to the people who have brought us the stories and
sayings than to send them away and refuse to talk to them. If we
understand how and why they have brought the stories and sayings to
us, we may attain better understanding of the situations, actions, and
speech in the earliest stages in the tradition.

There is a "posturing" in the first three Lukan beatitudes which reveals
their "aphoristic" nature, namely their presentation of a "personal"
rather than "universal" vision. After saying "blessed are the poor," the
beatitude says "because yours is the kingdom of God." The reasoning in
the Lukan form of the beatitudes is inverted from the usual syllogistic
form of reasoning. In other words, instead of reasoning from the general
to the particular, the Lukan beatitudes reason from the particular to the
general. If this is a feature in a significant number of sayings which have
the possibility of reflecting the earliest stages of the tradition, then we
must consider the possibility that this form of discourse was considered
to be characteristic of Jesus' speech. In the Matthean form, the tradition
is being sorted out "backwards." In an earlier article, I produced evidence
to suggest that this kind of development also occurs in tradition about
Alexander the Great. When people are confronted with an aphorism
like "blessed are the poor, for yours is the kingdom of God," they have
been confronted by an assertion which presupposes a logical structure.
As the tradition develops, there is a compulsion to bring that logical

25 Robbins, "Picking Up the Fragments."
structure to explicit expression. A "social" adaptation occurs in the formation of the Matthean beatitude, and this is enabled by the form of thinking in the Lukan version. In the first Lukan beatitude, the conclusion, "Blessed are the poor," has less specificity than the premise, "Yours is the kingdom of God." The unstated premise, "You are poor," has similar specificity, but it is likely to be a presupposition of those who were addressed by Jesus. Even today, it is fascinating to see the large number of "middle class" people who perceive themselves to be "poor," and their number increases among the rural middle class. The Matthean form has produced a different premise: "because theirs is the kingdom of God." This premise reflects an experience of alienation from the "poverty" referred to in the initial statement. Why? The beatitude will reflect alienation when the person who says it perceives the "poverty" as somehow separated from his or her experience, perhaps as a "goal" he or she desires but finds difficult to possess. In other words, the "subject" is lost behind the "concept," because the concept is either unrealizable or unattained by the person speaking.

In contrast, the second person plural in the Lukan form reflects direct "intersubjective communication." As Emile Benveniste has shown in Problems in General Linguistics, any form of "you" in discourse is an "indexical" sign which has meaning only in "an instance of discourse." This means that "you" acquires its meaning in the discrete instances in which "you" is said. In other words, "you" has no fixed meaning outside of those moments when "you" is addressed in speech. This can be seen best, perhaps, through contrast with nouns.

Each instance of use of a noun is referred to a fixed and "objective" notion, capable of remaining potential or being actualized in a particular object and always identical with the mental image it awakens.27

In contrast, "you" acquires its meaning in relation to the "I" who is speaking, and every statement presupposes "I say to you...."

"I" cannot be defined except in terms of "locution," not in terms of objects as a nominal sign is. "I" signifies "the person who is uttering the present instance of the discourse containing "I."... ["You" is the] individual spoken to in the present instance of discourse containing the linguistic instance "you."28

"You" in the Lukan beatitudes, then, creates "intersubjective commu-

28 Problems in General Linguistics, 218.
nication." In fact, according to Benveniste, subjectivity itself is created through discourse, and personal pronouns, either explicitly or implicitly present, are the place where subjectivity emerges.

Consciousness of self is only possible if it is experienced by contrast. I use “I” only when I am speaking to someone who will be a “you” in my address. It is this condition of dialogue that is constitutive of “person,” for it implies that reciprocally “I” becomes “you” in the address of the one who in his turn designates himself as “I.” Here we see a principle whose consequences are to spread out in all directions. Language is possible only because each speaker sets himself up as a “subject” by referring to himself as “I” in discourse. Because of this, “I” posits another person, the one who, being, as he is, completely exterior to “me,” becomes my echo to whom I say “you” and who says “you” to me.

For our discussion, this statement means that both the subject, “Jesus,” and the stated subjects, “you,” were created by Jesus’ use of speech in discrete instances that presupposed “I say to you…. In turn, we select or create the subject “Jesus” and the subjects he addressed as we choose or construct the speech we consider to be representative of Jesus. Thus, the presence of “you” in the Lukan beatitudes creates intersubjective communication. It appears that this form of the beatitudes accounts for the Matthean forms. The first Matthean beatitude has resulted from an attempt to move “backwards” in the logic of the Lukan form. Faced with “blessed are the poor, for yours is the kingdom of God,” the auditor had difficulty identifying, in contrast to Galilean village-town Jews, with “poverty” which produces “hunger” and “weeping.” Working off of the conclusion, “Blessed are the poor,” he constructed a new logic behind the conclusion. The logic works syllogistically as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Premise:</th>
<th>Blessed are those to whom the kingdom of God belongs.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Premise:</td>
<td>The kingdom of God belongs to the poor “in spirit.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conclusion:</td>
<td>Therefore, blessed are the poor “in spirit.”</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This constructed a “new logic” in a new field of discourse (a “spiritual” rather than “direct” field of discourse). In contrast, the syllogism supporting the Lukan beatitude would be something like:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Premise:</th>
<th>The kingdom of God belongs to people specially selected by God.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Premise:</td>
<td>You are people specially selected by God.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conclusion:</td>
<td>Therefore, yours is the kingdom of God.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

30 Problems in General Linguistics, 224–25.
The conclusion of this reasoning supports the first premise in the reasoning in the Lukan form:

Premise: Yours is the kingdom of God.
Premise: You are poor.
Conclusion: Therefore, the kingdom of God belongs to the poor.

The reasoning in the Lukan version begins with a conviction that the people spoken to possess the kingdom of God. Since they are poor and hungry and weep now, “Blessed are you who are poor and hunger and weep now.” This kind of “direct” communication holds the potential for a strong response among Galilean Jews and for adaptation in the Matthaean form by people who desire to belong to the kingdom but are not “poor” according to the usual definition.31

The beatitudes presupposed intersubjective communication between a subject “I” who speaks and a subject “you” who is spoken to. If I as the one spoken to am economically poor, I undoubtedly will understand the term “poor” to refer to a state of oppression which produces hunger, weeping, and mourning. If, however, I live in an economically satisfactory situation, I will seek a field of meaning in which “poor” can describe a quality of being which I consider myself to possess or desire to possess, and I will use a field of discourse which relates the term poor to those qualities. This surely explains the means by which the Lukan beatitudes refer to the economically poor and the Matthaean beatitudes refer to the “poor in spirit.” Whatever the Matthaean form means, its meaning is to be found in its relation to the other terms in the Matthaean beatitudes. Along with the “spiritual field” of discourse for “poor” we get the third person formulation, either because its formulators wanted to present a more proverbial form (the traditional beatitude form), or because “poor in spirit” is perceived to be a goal rather than a present possession.

From the perspective of the criterion of pragmatic relations, then, the interpreter faces two challenges. The first challenge is to attain a better understanding of the relation of the Matthaean “spiritual” field of discourse to the Lukan “direct” field of discourse in beatitudes L1 through L3. We can find information that aids our understanding if we turn from propositions which contain syllogistic reasoning to examples which support syllogisms or function as constituents within them.

3. The Relation of Propositions and Premises to Examples

Having discussed propositions and premises in the beatitudes, let us turn to examples. Examples stand in an inductive relation to propositions and premises. This means that examples operate within states of affairs in such a manner that they support or seem to support tacit, implied, and articulated premises and propositions. Premises and propositions, on the other hand, work deductively to ground one another and to move from the sphere of emotive and cognitive states of affairs to the states of affairs displayed by examples. The pragmatic relation of premises, propositions, and examples can exhibit plausible Traditionsgeschichte, coherence, hermeneutical potential, and hermeneutical adequacy.

The examples in Matt 5:38–42 and Luke 6:27–36, the passages Dominic Crossan analyzes in "Divine Immediacy and Human Immediacy," work in an inductive relation to propositions and premises in the tradition. The Matthean version reads as follows:

Matthew 5:38–42:

Proposition: "You have heard that it was said, 'An eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth,' but I say to you, 'Do not resist one who is evil.'"

Examples:

(a) But if any one strikes you on the right cheek, turn to him the other also;
(b) and if any one would sue you and take your coat, let him have your cloak as well;
(c) and if any one forces you to go one mile, go with him two miles.
(d) Give to him who begs from you,
(e) and do not refuse him who would borrow from you.

This unit in Matthew exhibits how examples support propositions and premises inductively. In this context, the examples of turning the other cheek, etc. support the proposition, "Do not resist one who is evil." The interesting thing, however, is that the last two examples do not support the proposition, since there is nothing obviously evil about one who begs and one who borrows. Once again, then, the first three items are related pragmatically, like the first three beatitudes in the Lukan form. These examples stand in a qualitative or accumulative sequence which approximates the arrangement of narrative with one story after another, rather than a syllogistic sequence of premises and propositions.
But now we may observe another phenomenon. The proposition, "Do not resist one who is evil," has a close pragmatic relation to beatitude B4 (L4; M9): "Blessed are you when men revile you and persecute you and utter all kinds of evil against you falsely for my sake."

The proposition in Matt 5:38a and the beatitude in Matt 5:11 and Luke 6:22 envision an external threat of aggression. There is an important difference between them, however. The proposition in Matt 5:38a does not indicate whether the person is being abused as a result of his or her ascribed status in society or as a result of an achieved status "for the sake of the Son of man." This takes us to the examples of being struck on the cheek, having one's coat taken away, and being forced to go one mile. These situations arise intrinsically from people's ascribed status as they are subject to the desires and rules of those in power—those who take what services and goods they need and want to support their life of conspicuous consumption. In other words, these three examples represent the same field of discourse as the first three beatitudes in Q and Luke.32

In addition, let us notice that each "example" contains some form of "you," just like the Lukan beatitudes:

If any one strikes you on the right cheek, . . .
If any one would sue you and take your coat, . . .
If any one forces you to go one mile, . . .

With this observation we make an informative discovery: both in the "propositions" as represented by the first three Lukan beatitudes and in the first three Matthean "examples," the reasoning moves from the personal and specific to the less specific. Maybe here we have an important characteristic of the earliest stage of the tradition. Perhaps one sector of the earliest field of discourse addresses rural village-town people on the basis of their ascribed status in life and uses second person in a form that creates intersubjective communication which addresses that social situation directly.

Now we can make another observation. While propositions may be supported inductively by examples, examples contain implicit propositions. We observed above that the Matthean version introduces the examples with an explicit proposition: "Do not resist one who is evil." There is a gain in language in the explicit articulation of the proposition, however, since the examples do not refer to those who strike, sue, and force as "evil ones." A more neutral articulation of the tacit proposition

32 See Tannehill, The Sword of His Mouth, 67-77, for a detailed social-rhetorical analysis of these examples.
would describe the action as abuse or oppression. Thus, the proposition implied by the three examples could more accurately be stated as: "Do not resist the one who abuses or oppresses you." We must notice, however, that specific examples related to a specifically ascribed social situation lead to the proposition. We cannot easily conclude, therefore, that the examples imply an application of this proposition or principle within any situation of external force. Rather, these examples give us an additional glimpse into a field of discourse which addressed people who were trapped by no choice of their own in a situation of subordinance, abuse, and oppression.

We get further insight into the examples in Matt 5:38–40 when we compare them with conditional commandments in the Hebrew Bible. The conditional laws in the Hebrew Bible presuppose that "social order" should rectify a wrong done to the abused person. For example, "If a man borrows anything of his neighbor, and it is hurt or dies, the owner not being with it, he shall make full restitution" (Exod 23:4). Moreover, when "you" is used, the person addressed regularly is the actor: "If you meet your enemy's ox or his ass going astray, you shall bring it back to him" (Exod 23:4). In contrast, the person addressed by the Matthean examples cannot presuppose that social abuse will be rectified. Rather, those who take the coat and force a person to go one mile are likely to be aligned with the guardians of the social order and consider themselves in need of these goods and services. Presupposing this situation, the examples address the hearer in the same field of discourse found in the first three Lukan beatitudes. Thus, an integrated field of discourse emerges in:

Blessed are the poor, for yours is the kingdom of God.
Blessed are those who hunger now, for you shall be satisfied.
Blessed are those who weep now, for you shall laugh.
If any one strikes you on the right cheek, turn to him the other also;
and if any one would sue you and take your coat, let him have your cloak as well;
and if any one forces you to go one mile, go with him two miles.

While these statements are constituents of the same field of discourse, the first three are deductive propositions and the last three are inductive examples which contain an implicit proposition. As the propositions and examples work toward one another in the pragmatic setting of discourse, inferential bridging occurs. With the presence of the examples and the beatitudes alongside one another, the tacit proposition in the examples receives an additional component, making it: "Blessed are you who are abused and oppressed." Here we see the base upon which the last beatitude was formulated. The underlying premise for the beatitude
in its Matthean form is "blessed are those whom men revile and persecute, and against whom all manner of evil is uttered falsely" and in its Lukan form is "blessed are those whose fathers hate, exclude, insult and cast out their name as evil." The verbs describing the abuse result from situations related to a social state adopted "for the sake of the Son of man." The third person formulation results from the introduction of the prophets to provide a rationale through analogy. The second person dimension persists when the reasoning is related to "my sake" or "the sake of the Son of man." In other words, the intersubjective form of communication maintains itself in the reasoning when a particular social role is adopted on an interpersonal basis, namely "for the sake of the Son of man." With the subject matter we have been analyzing, the field of discourse containing direct address to those in an ascribed state of poverty, abuse and oppression appears to be diachronically primary to the direct address to those in an achieved state which causes them to be reviled, persecuted, hated, excluded, insulted, and falsely or evilly spoken against "for the sake of the Son of man (my sake)."

4. Conclusion

In summary, it will be helpful as we search for the earliest stages of the Jesus tradition to clarify the relation between semantic and pragmatic fields of discourse. The dialectic of Crossan's book In Fragments intermingles pragmatic and semantic analysis. Thus, often he is thinking about the potential meaning of the terms, phrases, and structures anywhere at anytime, while at other times he is thinking about the meaning of the terms, phrases, and structures in some literary, historical, or social context.

Many philosophers of language, folklorists, and linguists have become convinced that language functions in pragmatic fields that bridge to other pragmatic fields through the semantic potential of terms, phrases, and structures. Dominic Crossan has helped us immeasurably to understand the semantic structure and potential of aphorisms in the Jesus tradition. He has also, at times, explored the pragmatic coherence of double sayings and clusters. But we need to remain attentive to the dimension of language being discussed or analyzed, its semantic or pragmatic relations, its potential meaning somewhere, sometime or its meaning within a particular pragmatic field in the tradition.

The first three beatitudes in Luke 6:20–21 and the first three examples in Matt 5:39–41 reflect an early field of discourse addressed to people in an ascribed state that brings hunger, weeping, abuse, and oppression. This field of discourse is supported by a conviction that God's kingly activity specially selects these people for blessing. The Matthean version
of the beatitudes reflects a "spiritual" field of discourse based on possession of attributes of God's righteousness rather than possession of God's kingly action in and of itself. It will be important to search for components in the tradition, which are part of the earliest field of discourse, that support this "spiritual" system based on God's righteousness. In the verses we have analyzed, this "spiritual" system is a result of bridging from the earlier field of discourse.

The last beatitude in Matthew and Luke is a result of inferential bridging between propositions and examples in the earliest field of discourse represented by the first three Lukan beatitudes and the first three examples in Matthew. The basis for this beatitude is the implicit proposition, "Blessed are you who are abused and oppressed," which hovers near when the first three beatitudes and the first three examples exist alongside one another. The version of the beatitude in Matthew and Luke results from a line of reasoning about the Son of man and the prophets that we have not attempted to analyze in this article. The beatitude is built upon an inferential bridge between propositions and examples in the earliest field of discourse. In its present form, it uses reasoning which we have no basis, from our limited analysis, to assign to the same field of discourse.

Using the criterion of pragmatic relations as our guiding principle, we have explored one small segment of the Jesus tradition and uncovered propositions and examples that address people in an ascribed state of hunger, weeping, abuse and oppression. We also have identified bridging to a "spiritual" field of discourse and to discourse supported by allegiance to the Son of man and analogy with the prophets. Analysis of these fields of discourse and the bridging between and among them takes us through the rich systems of thought that nurtured earliest Christianity, but it also has helped us to catch a glimpse of the earliest field of discourse surrounding the situations, actions, and speech of Jesus himself.

Works Consulted

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