The authors of this volume have analyzed early traditions about Jesus in the light of rhetorical theory and practice common to the Hellenistic culture of the time. Five detailed studies present the results of different types of composition in the gospels. The studies are examples of what might be learned in the pursuit of a rhetorical investigation of the Jesus traditions, and they illustrate application to a range of issues encountered in the synoptic texts and their traditions.

The express aim has been to demonstrate rhetorical composition in clusters of sayings not normally regarded as patterned, much less as patterned in forms of argumentation that were current in conventional discourse of the first century. In the course of these studies, however, more than exegetical demonstration has occurred. The investigations contain important observations both about the culture of rhetoric at large and about the implications of rhetorical practice for the transmission of the teachings of Jesus in the movements stemming from him. It is appropriate to summarize these observations now as a conclusion to this set of studies. We can organize what has been learned by focusing upon (a) the rhetoric of chreia elaboration, (b) the composition of pronouncement stories, and (c) the creation of a Christian *paideia*. We will indicate where new perspectives on Christian origins have been won in relation to more conventional scholarly views. At the end the authors will make some suggestions for further research, since these studies are intended to chart an arena of investigation yet to be thoroughly explored.
1. The Rhetoric of Chreia Elaboration

The point of departure for the studies as a whole was the discovery that the pronouncement stories in the gospels could be defined as chreiai in keeping with Hellenistic practice. Robbins has discussed the significance of this discovery in chapter 1. New Testament scholars have been aware that the pronouncement stories in the gospels bore some relation to the Hellenistic anecdote, but very little work had been done on the form and function of chreiai in Hellenistic literature, and none at all on the phenomenon of elaboration as practiced in the schools. The authors of this volume had to take seriously what the teachers of rhetoric said about chreiai and their elaboration before they could give a fresh assessment of the pronouncement stories.

Mack has discussed in chapter 2 what has been learned about chreiai from studies in the progymnasmata. He pointed out that rhetors regarded chreiai as examples of persuasive speech and submitted them to rigorous rhetorical analysis. Rhetors could describe types of response to situations, with moral maxims on one end of a gradient curve and aphoristic rejoinders on the other. They understood all the chreiai as ways of making "arguments," and they classified them accordingly. Viewed in this way, chreiai did not cease to be anecdotes of memorable occasions in which humor, sagacity, or wisdom was evoked, but they did take on a distinctly new nuance. They also regarded chreiai as evidence for a person's rhetorical skills in argumentation.

To regard aphoristic speech as rhetorical performance may seem strange to many New Testament scholars. That is because proverbs, pithy rejoinders, and clever applications of similes and metaphors among the sayings of Jesus have not usually been thought of as chreiai that contained "arguments." The view has been that the sayings of Jesus were more like maxims with didactic and ethical intent. Nevertheless, collecting chreiai for comparison by using the rhetors' descriptions did garner many pronouncement stories about Jesus along with a very large number of stories about other men of note in the biographic literatures of the time. When surveyed, Jesus' responses in the pronouncement stories did not appear to be much different in style from those characteristic for Hellenistic chreiai. If the rhetors were right about chreiai, so the question came to be posed, Could the nature of Jesus' responses also fit their rhetoric? A closer look at the logic of Jesus' responses was in order.

The survey of the pronouncement stories in comparison with chreiai undertaken in this book stumbled upon a feature of some significance. Not many of the stories about Jesus were brief, snappy "textbook" chreiai. Most were stories that joined not one, but several sayings. The point of expanded chreiai, moreover, was frequently difficult to isolate, or the way to the point difficult to trace. In the progymnasmata, to be sure, there were references to "paraphrasing" and "amplifying" brief narratives, including chreiai. And some of this discussion could help us understand the ways in which sayings accrued and changes occurred in the transmission of chreiai about Jesus. But we needed something more to grasp the logic behind the phenomenon of clustered sayings.

Mack's discovery of the pattern and logic of elaboration in Hermogenes' progymnasmata provided a model for investigating the rationale of sayings units in which there was little discursive guidance. In his elaboration of a chreia, Hermogenes used proverbial material and conventional metaphors to develop a thesis. The astute interpreter could infer the logic of elaboration from the functions Hermogenes indicated for each additional saying in his patterned example, and could follow the theme by paying attention to the composition of the unit as a whole. Tracing the functions back to discussions of theory in the classical handbooks of rhetoric, two conclusions could be drawn. One was that the list of functions Hermogenes suggested for the elaboration was actually an outline of the major moves in the construction of a "complete argument," a reduction of the classical speech of deliberation to its basic components. The other conclusion was that a reader could explain the logic behind this outline. A given case (or chreia) was "confirmed" when the speaker could demonstrate alignment among the various orders of discourse common to the culture. Agreement among cultural conventions was the basis of the logic of persuasion.

The pattern of elaboration, the notion of inventing an argument, and the use of comparative imagery for supporting the logic of a thesis, should now be understandable concepts to the reader. To clarify these concepts and their usefulness for the rhetorical analysis of proverbial material has been one of the major subsidiary aims of the book. The authors selected pericope with the elaboration pattern in mind, but also for the purpose of illustrating a variety of compositional techniques made possible by that pattern. In Mack's study of the anointing of Jesus, for instance, it could be shown that an author could elaborate a simple chreia by specifying the point of the challenge and developing the response into a full argumentation. In this case, a very sophisticated logic was concentrated within five tightly knit sayings that compressed an elaboration into a single, interlocking response. Robbins' study of the discipleship sayings, on the other hand, analyzed the phenomenon of a cluster of chreiai as a compositional technique with rhetorical intention. There, and in his study of the Beelzebul stories, Robbins pointed out that the addition of a very few items was sufficient to change the rhetorical focus of a chreia. In his study of the variants of the chreia about plucking grain on the sabbath, moreover, Robbins could show various ways in which several authors pressed the elaboration pattern to accommodate judicial as well as deliberative argumentation. And Mack's study of the
set of parables in Mark 4 disclosed another compositional arrangement. In this case, it was a composition that followed the elaboration pattern, yet consisted only of analogies.

These studies, however, have touched upon aspects of rhetorical theory and practice other than those easily illustrated by the pattern of elaboration. This was especially clear in Robbins's analyses of the Beelzebul pericope where various synoptic authors had made different decisions when making their first moves to reinterpret the story. Robbins was able to distinguish among these decisions only by reference to discussions of different speech types and their issues or circumstances found in the more advanced handbooks. The complexity of rhetorical theory and the intricacies of rhetorical composition need to be emphasized if the usefulness of the pattern of elaboration is not to be misunderstood. The pattern is extremely helpful as an introduction to the practice of rhetoric in the composition of gnomic, thematic, and biographic writings, but it cannot illustrate all of the options possible for any given elaboration, nor serve as a decoder for determining the precise rhetorical function of any given component of an elaboration. An elaboration need not have contained all of the items in Hermogenes' pattern in order to have been effective. Items need not always to have followed Hermogenes' order. And an elaboration might duplicate arguments of a given type, _parabolai_ for instance, in order to underscore a single point, or develop a theme, rather that to move the argument ahead as was the case in Hermogenes. The value of the elaboration pattern has been to demonstrate argumentation at work in aphoristic material, not to exhaust the possibilities of rhetorical composition that used such material. We should not think of it as a wooden outline, but as a grammar.

In chapter 2 Mack made the point that the pattern of elaboration reproduced the major sections of the traditional speech form. He pointed out the distinction between those items that established the thesis and those that offered supporting arguments. The items that established the thesis included (1) a restatement of the chreia in paraphrase, (2) a statement of the rationale, and (3) a statement of the contrary. By means of these items, an author could translate a chreia into a proposition and establish it by stating its reasonableness in the rationale and by clarifying it in the contrary. The author could then support the proposition by means of (1) an analogy, (2) an example, and (3) a judgment. Hermogenes used the term elaboration to designate the exercise as a whole, even though, technically, the term best described the function of the supporting arguments rather than the establishment of the proposition.

In his work, Robbins has emphasized the logic of argumentation involved in the establishment of a thesis. He has noted that all of the items in the pattern of elaboration need not be present in order to formulate and support a proposition and that analysis must begin by making certain of the proposition and its primary rationale. From his studies we can see that the three major techniques for translating a chreia into an arguable issue were: (1) restating (or paraphrasing) the chreia as a proposition that could be argued, (2) supporting the proposition through one or more reasons, in effect creating what Aristotle called an enthymeme, and (3) clarifying the proposition by means of a contrary statement, a restatement of the issue from an angle that would not be true or acceptable. This finding suggests that rhetors gave particular attention to the first moves required in the elaboration of a chreia. These moves correspond to the first set of items in Hermogenes' elaboration, those that establish the proposition to be supported further by analogy, example, and citation. Since, however, according to Aristotle, analogies and examples were primary means for creating propositional enthymemes, the rhetorical function of figurative material within an elaboration may be quite complex, analogies and examples serving now to establish a proposition, now to support it with reasons, and now to develop its definition, theme, or application. Often, moreover, a single saying can serve two or more rhetorical functions. The studies in this volume illustrate complexities of this kind.

In the Lukan version of the sayings about foxes, birds, and burying the dead, for instance, the addition of the saying about plowing provides a rationale for leaving the dead to bury their own dead and for leaving parents without saying farewell. The presence of this rationale gives the argument an enthymematic form that interrelates deductive and inductive reasoning. Nevertheless, the saying also presents an argument from analogy, an argument from the contrary, and an argument from example. The analogy, taken from the arena of agriculture and the circumstances of plowing, gives substantial support to the proposition that a person should follow Jesus without compromise. The way Luke phrases it, however, makes the point by means of the contrary statement that no one who puts his hand to a plow and looks back is fit for the kingdom of God. This is an argument from that which is _not_ acceptable, used to clarify what _should_ be done. The analogy actually produces two images: (1) looking back, which should _not_ be done, and (2) looking ahead, which _should_ be done. Viewed from yet another perspective, the analogy of a person who puts his hand to the plow can function as an argument from example by depicting someone who starts a task and pursues it with unaltering commitment. Even though the example is not a named person from the past in the mode of Hermogenes' reference to Demosthenes, it is a social example that provides the elaboration with the same kind of supporting argument. The presence of an argument from analogy, an argument from the contrary, and an argument from
example in this saying does not disqualify it from its primary function as a rationale for the exhortations to follow Jesus without hesitation and without compromise. Because the imagery is so clear and the rhetorical possibilities so manifest, however, another author could easily build upon it and thus develop a new elaboration. The author of the new elaboration would have to decide how to take the saying, whether as the rationale, or as an argument from the contrary, from analogy, from example, or even as a judgment. In the analysis of this elaboration in chapter three, Robbins identified the function of this saying as a rationale because, when viewed within the elaboration given, it formed an enthymeme and served as a proposition.

Thus the set of studies in this book have positioned the elaboration pattern as a bridge from the larger field of advanced rhetorical theory to the rhetoric of gnomic and biographic compositions. The elaboration pattern has made it possible to travel back and forth, now analyzing curious concentrations of proverbial imagiers for rhetorical coherence, and now exploring the technical handbooks for discussions of rhetorical practice not clarified by reference to the pattern of elaboration alone. The hope is that the pattern can serve as sufficient introduction to the rhetoric of the pronouncement stories in spite of the complex twists and turns encountered in their many combinations of rhetorical techniques. Advanced knowledge of classical rhetoric and its influence upon Greco-Roman literatures would greatly enhance, no doubt, the further investigation of synoptic compositions. Even within the limits of the present set of studies, the surprise has been that the more the investigations gave the culture of rhetoric its due, the greater the sophistication of the synoptic traditions and authors appeared. The discovery of such intention and finesse in the composition of pronouncement stories presents something of a challenge to traditional scholarly views of the Jesus traditions. Observations on the nature of this challenge can now be made.

2. The Composition of Pronouncement Stories

In chapter 1, Robbins reviewed the history of scholarship on apophthegms, paradigms, and pronouncement stories in the synoptic tradition. The review set the stage for a redefinition of pronouncement stories as chreiai. Robbins emphasized the importance of this recognition, for with it far reaching questions about the early reminiscences of Jesus gain new specificity. If the pronouncement stories are chreiai, and if chreiai were familiar vehicles for depicting the character and teaching of noteworthy persons, the importance of pronouncement stories in the Jesus tradition means that his followers remembered Jesus in much the same way as other persons of importance. Thus, pronouncement stories take their place among sayings, parables, miracle stories, and other biographical materials as a distinct but common form of memory and imagination. The integrity of the chreia means that interpreters should not separate saying and scene, and that behavior as well as statements belong to the primary form of rehearsing. Robbins's critique of the form-critics thus deserves reiteration: in our quest for the earliest traditions, we cannot privilege sayings over scenes or narratives in which actions make the point.

A study of the rhetorical intention of the Hellenistic chreia thus introduces a reassessment of traditional assumptions about the language of the Jesus traditions. The bifurcation of the sayings of Jesus into apocalyptic (or prophetic and eschatological) "announcements" on the one hand, and sapiential (or parabolic and aphoristic) "teachings" on the other, a scholarly convention in the wake of Bultmann, was partially overcome when Taylor coined the term "pronouncement." The notion of making pronouncements catches up both aspects of the sayings of Jesus as a whole even while suggesting a sense of the speaker's authority. Thus, the new term benfits a comfortable compromise. The term seemed especially appropriate, moreover, as definitive for the function of the sayings in those units of tradition distinguished as pronouncement stories. Since, by definition, these stories depict Jesus making an authoritative pronouncement on a situation. For many scholars, Jesus' authority to make pronouncements has not appeared strange, and they have regarded the term pronouncement as descriptive for the nature of the sayings of Jesus in general.

If the pronouncement stories are elaborated chreiai, however, the question of the speaker'sauthority involves an assessment of the speaker's rhetoric. One suspects that Taylor coined the term pronouncement largely with respect to sayings we have identified as judgments in the elaborated chreiai. Jesus' authoritative pronouncements are certainly a noteworthy feature of these stories and thus justify the designation of the literary form and function. In many instances, however, analysis can show that the particular saying serving as an authoritative pronouncement entered the textual tradition at the point of elaboration. If one starts instead with the rhetoric characteristic for unelaborated chreiai, often still at the core of the pronouncement stories, retort rather than pronouncement would be the better description. The significance of this observation should not be overlooked, for a clever rejoinder implies a rhetoric and an authority quite different from those assumed for the Jesus who makes authoritative pronouncements.

The studies in this volume have not forced the question of the use of unelaborated chreiai at some early stage of a Jesus movement, nor argued for a reconstruction of the mode of speech used by the historical Jesus on the basis of the incidence of chreiai. We have pursued these studies at the level of redaction criticism, working with the textual units.
in their several literary contexts. The suspicion might well be, however, that, in general, it was an originally aphoristic response that was later elaborated. If so, the earlier form of wisdom attributed to Jesus in these traditions would best be described as aphoristic. The logic would not be that of pronouncements, whether "prophetic," or grounded in the self-referential authority of a superior sage, but of critical insight gained by the practice of μητρικαί. It would be wrong, therefore, to regard the wisdom attributed to Jesus in the unelaborated stories as proclamatory, programmatic, revelatory, or unique. It would be an occasional wisdom, inviting assent and assessment by redescribing situations. Taking the lead from the chresmata attributed to him, Jesus' wisdom would have included penetrating insight into the critical moments of life in a society held to be deserving of critique. Critique, however, appears to have been offered generally, not directed at specific institutions, and in the aphoristic mode, that is, rhetorically astute per occasion.

Nevertheless, chresmata should not be taken as historical reminiscences merely because of their authenticity as a primary form of memory in Greco-Roman society. That is because chresmata bear the marks of being crafted. The meaning of an action or saying is assured only when the response is constructed to fit a carefully construed situation. In the quest to locate a chreia among differing traditions, we must discern the issue engaged by that scene plus response. Knowledge of the use of chresmata in philosophical school traditions and in Hellenistic literature makes it possible to understand why attributions of only a certain kind might collect around a founding figure. It also suggests that participants in a given movement regarded only certain characteristics as important for the founder of that movement with its particular practices. Knowledge of the use of chresmata in the common schools of Hellenistic education and rhetoric makes it possible to imagine how the ancients produced such chresmata. It was "speech-in-character," not the "authenticity" of a historical reminiscence, that counted in the cultivation of memory and mimesis. Thus, we must imagine incremental shifts both in "speech" and in "character" for the transmission of chresmata, just as change in the rhetorical focus of a chreia is the rule for the history of a chreia's elaboration.

This perspective on the transmission of the early Jesus traditions presents a challenge to customary views. Scholars have usually thought of tradents as copyists, collectors, or "interpreters" of sayings that originated with Jesus. They frequently speak of "floating" λόγια and imagine the sayings of Jesus to have travelled at first in the oral tradition independently of one another and of narrative context. This view has allowed a composite characterization of Jesus as the original speaker of many types of sayings that, even in isolation, are understood to have been charged with intrinsic meaning and to have created their own trajectories. To account for the appearance of these sayings in the literary contexts in which we now find them, scholars have made various proposals about the reasons for written collections and the principles of their composition. These proposals thus view many of the sayings that occur in the pronouncement stories as originally independent λόγια and regard the clusters that formed as the result of collecting λόγια by type or theme. A saying thought to be valuable would have been preserved, accordingly, simply by adding it to the collection.

The studies in this volume have shown that thematic selection is indeed a feature of composition in the clusters of sayings in pronouncement stories. Nevertheless, the underlying principle of selection was undoubtedly rhetorical. Again, we might still imagine early followers of Jesus making their selections in some cases from a fund of sayings already attributed to Jesus. But, in other instances, they appear to have created new sayings and to have domesticated proverbs and metaphors common to the times. Variants at the redactional level illustrate the wide-ranging authorial activity of those involved in portrayals of Jesus as a powerful speaker. When one sees, moreover, that the issues addressed by these elaborations fit best in circumstances of concern to the tradents themselves, grounds for such authorial activity are not difficult to imagine, though they need to be worked out in studies yet to be accomplished. The lesson from the chresmata and its patterns of elaboration is a call to revise prevailing views of the teachings of Jesus, and a challenge to research the early history of the traditions of those teachings.

3. The Creation of a Christian Paideia

In chapter 1, Robbins rehearsed the history of New Testament scholarship in which only a few scholars brought some awareness of classical rhetoric to bear upon studies of the pronouncement stories. He analyzed the reasons for repeated hesitations to explore thoroughly the similarities that these scholars had noted between pronouncement stories and Hellenistic chresmata. Some of the reasons for turning away from Hellenistic models are quite understandable. Many stem from the observation that, in comparison to Hellenistic modes of discourse, the language of the Jesus traditions brings a new ethos to expression. The novelty of the Jesus movements seemed to require a distinctive articulation, so that the differences between the synoptic materials and their Hellenistic counterparts appeared more important than the similarities.

The set of studies presented here has emphasized the correspondence between pronouncement stories and Hellenistic chresmata elaborated according to rhetorical conventions. The high degree of correspondence is surprising, however, in light of the claims to novelty and distinctiveness characteristic for the new movements. The reason it is surprising
can be stated quite precisely. A logic of persuasion that was culturally conditioned was the basis of the rhetoric of elaboration in Hellenistic provenance. Argumentation rested ultimately upon cultural conventions and traditions that were shared and in force. Orators had to show that their propositions agreed with the values, logic, world-view, historic exemplifications, and literate wisdom of the culture in order for their audiences to confirm them. One of the functions of the pattern of elaboration was to list the topics from which an orator could make just such an appeal to culture as a comprehensive system. Items in the pattern were not invitations to invent a new system of values, but to find strong and convincing figures from the reservoir of commonly accepted truisms. That being the case, neither the pattern nor the lore indexed by the components of the pattern would seem to be appropriate vehicles for a social movement in the process of marking its differences from that larger cultural context.

Noting that the domestication of the pattern of elaboration must have presented a challenge for early Jesus movements, two kinds of questions emerge. The first seeks to account for the circumstances under which the early followers of Jesus pursued elaborations on the Hellenistic model in spite of the lack of agreement between the cultural assumptions inherent in the model and the contrastive values emerging in the new social experiment. The second question asks whether the elaborations achieved the marks of accommodation to their new social context. Both questions call for investigation more detailed than that of the present studies. But on the basis of the studies as presented we can make a few preliminary observations nonetheless. The ultimate answers to these questions may prove to be an important contribution to studies in Christian origins.

Taking the second question first, we can begin by noting that four items of Hermogenes’ pattern were frequently missing from the pronouncement stories: (1) the introductory encomium, (2) the well-known example from history, (3) the literary citation from the ancient sages, and (4) the final exhortation. Because the pronouncement stories occur in a larger narrative context in distinction from the speech situation assumed by Hermogenes’ exercise, the general lack of introductory encomia and final exhortations on the part of the synoptic authors is not a serious problem. The matter is different with the infrequency of examples and authoritative citations. The fact that synoptic authors did not refer to well-known examples from cultural history, whether Greek or Jewish, and did not cite traditional literatures, whether Greek or Jewish, is, of course, quite understandable. A group at pains to distinguish itself from other cultural traditions could not afford to appeal to the history and literature of those cultures to make its novel points. Only the Matthean version of the story about plucking grain on the Sabbath gives a citation from ancient authority as an argument (‘I desire mercy and not sacrifice,’ Matt 12:7). As for well-known examples from history, we have encountered only the figure of David in the story about plucking grain, and the figures of Jonah, the Ninevites, the Queen of the South, and Solomon in the Lukan version of the Beelzebul controversy. Of great significance is the fact that the stories used all of these references, not to marshal positive precedent for a Jesus proposition, but to argue the contrast between the Jesus movement and the Jewish tradition. They used them as “negative examples” that used the scriptures to tell against the force of Jewish culture as determining for Christian propositions.

It now becomes understandable why the synoptic elaborations are heavy with rationales, contraries, and analogies. Rationales were absolutely necessary for discourse of any kind to emerge. Contraries were required in the nature of the case if difference from others was the issue to be addressed. And analogies were the one form of argument that need not imply culturally specific values, for the members of this burgeoning movement could easily have found or invented new figures and new applications for conventional figures in order to support novel propositions. A survey of the analogies encountered in the studies shows that we must attribute astonishing ingenuity to those who invented them. We immediately notice in these stories applications of proverbial images, sayings, and metaphors. And the depiction of striking and unusual circumstances and events is also frequent. By definition, the παραβολή would capture the usual occurrence of general practice in support of a particular proposition or case. In the synoptic elaborations, however, the unusual circumstance often serves to illustrate a proposition calling for another order of things.

For example, one story uses plowing a field, which presupposes a commitment to home life, to illustrate the willingness to leave home, family, and even an unburied father to begin an itinerant life (Luke 9:62). Likewise, another story uses the activity of priests with the burnt offering, an example that presupposes careful observance of sabbath laws, to illustrate “violation of the sabbath without guilt” (Matt 12:5). Moreover, when the analogy of planting seeds is primary in Mark 4, there is no reference to “preparing the ground beforehand” (Hippocrates II), “plowing the seed into the ground” (Antiphon fr. 60), or “cultivating it so it will bear fruit” (Quintilian, Inst. Orat. V.xi.24). Instead of supporting “regular, disciplined” activity, the analogy depicts “sleeping and rising night and day” until a process occurs that is “out of the hands” of the sower.

Both Robbins and Mack have remarked on the preponderance of analogies that argue for the novel or unusual, as well as the use of analogies where one would expect to find an example. We have already suggested why classical examples are missing in early Christian elabora-
tions. But it is now also obvious that a fund of examples from the early histories of the Jesus movements also is not in evidence. This lack of lore specific to exemplary Christian behavior compounded the problem of argumentation by paradigm. Early Jesus believers, however, found a very interesting solution to this problem. Where the rhetoric required paradigms, synoptic authors invented a non-specific example. The large number of sayings that describe the activity or character of "the one who ..." fit the needs of the new argumentation perfectly. It visualized a particular case, but without the usual name, location, and place in the roster of well-known persons. This type of example, which can be called a general example, gave an added advantage as well. The example need not claim that anyone actually had lived as suggested, only that it was possible and/or necessary that one do so. Thus, the lack of examples, either from the culture at large or from the group's own tradition, did not prevent the construction of arguments from example. The synoptic authors simply made them up in keeping with the ideals held to be exemplary for the new social movement.

The substitute for ancient witnesses, to which we have given the technical label judgment, worked out another way. No elaboration studied lacked a strong authoritative pronouncement, but the sources of these pronouncements were not the poets, sages, and authors of traditional literatures. All were attributed to Jesus except the quotation from Hosea in Matthew's version of the Plucking of the Grain. So Jesus became the sole source of judgments within the movements stemming from him. That has always seemed reasonable to those who have studied the stories, since the singular authority of Jesus for Christians has appeared to be self-evident. Now it is clear, however, that the needs of those engaged in elaborations may have contributed to the attribution of such authority to Jesus. How could that have happened?

Returning to the first question posed above, and recalling an earlier discussion about the probability of a development from brief chreiai about Jesus to elaborated pronouncement stories, a history of the chreia tradition can be imagined. The chreia about the physician in Mark 2:15–17 is a fine example of a brief chreia slightly elaborated. Assuming that the elaboration consisted of (1) amplifying the setting in order to specify those who objected to Jesus' eating with "tax collectors and sinners," and of (2) adding the statement that "I came not to call the righteous, but sinners," we can see the change in social circumstance from chreia rehearsal to chreia elaboration. The chreia originally made its point teasingly, subverting the logic assumed by the objection merely by means of witty juxtaposition of two incongruous instances of contact with uncleanness. The social circumstance that supported the rehearsal of such a chreia must have called for awareness of some tensions between the practice of the Jesus people and certain Jewish codes, but the tensions need not have escalated to the point of extravagant claims and painful separations. The addition of the self-referential statement and the specification of the objectors tells another tale. A division of the house has taken place and an absolute seriousness has displaced the humor.

If one assumes that the process of elaborating chreiai took place in tandem with the social histories of early Jesus movements, one might imagine a development from simpler forms of argumentation to full elaborations of precise propositions. One of the results of the studies in this volume is the discovery that Matthew and Luke contain the more highly developed patterns, and that each experimented not only with elaboration on the deliberative model, but with judicial issues and epikeletic topics as well. In the case of the Markan elaboration of the chreia about the physician mentioned above, a single statement was sufficient to establish the rationale. We might note, however, that the addition of the statement about calling not the righteous, but sinners, also functions as a paraphrase or restatement of the chreia and thus retains something of the original sense of enigma. It also, however, functions as contrary, example, and judgment. In the story about fasting that follows the chreia about the physician, a somewhat larger elaboration is in evidence (Mark 2:18–22). The story about fasting uses a separate statement to provide the contrary (vs 20), and it gives two additional analogies (vv 21–22). Thus, there is evidence for experimentation with simple forms of elaboration at a relatively early stage in the history of chreia transmission.

It is clear, however, that we cannot chart the stages of chreia transmission in early Jesus movements on the basis of the studies presented in this volume. Clean distinctions may not be possible in any case merely on formal grounds, since "complete elaborations" were not a sufficient mark of "later" developments. In order to control such an investigation, we would need additional considerations, including the correlation of issues addressed with junctures of social histories identified, as well as with changes that occur in the characterization of Jesus and the grounds for his authority. Nevertheless, the present investigations do marshal sufficient evidence to make a final observation of some importance. The nature of Jesus' authority for those who cultivated his memory with chreiai changed in the course of elaboration. The Jesus of the unelaborated chreia does not speak with the same kind of authority as the Jesus who goes on to argue for its principle. And the Jesus who turns a witty rejoinder into a serious proposition does not speak with the same kind of authority as the Jesus who concludes an elaboration with a self-referential pronouncement or a "christological" claim. One might be able to understand the process by which Jesus became the sole authority for early movements stemming from him,
given the novel nature of these social experiments and the lack of other authorities to which they could appeal. But we should not take for granted the phenomenal concentration of authority in the single figure of Jesus that resulted. In the course of creating a new paideia, tradents of the Jesus traditions did not come to speech as authors of their own elaborations of chreiai about Jesus, commenting on his wisdom and adding their own reasons and exhortations for paying heed. Instead, they retold the stories and let the founder of their new movements speak for them in order to avoid any appeal to the claims and logics of the cultures at large. By subverting in this way the logic of Hellenistic culture, the Jesus movements created a teacher whose authority no one could question, a teacher whose statements were final. The elaboration of chreiai characterized by μήτεισ produced a rhetoric of sheer pronouncement.